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KUALA LUMPUR IS THE capital of the Federation of Malaysia and a 
prosperous metropolis. Its two million residents live in a well-organised 
space. The centre is home to colonial buildings in good repair and to austere 
skyscrapers, including the Petronas Twin Towers, which rise to a height of 452 
metres. In a ring around the centre, there are the shophouses of Chinatown and 
Little India. And on the edges of the city, there are neat new areas and smartly 
swept kampongs. The city calmly gives way to the countryside. 
Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, is a stranger to smooth transitions. The city is 
besieged by an impoverished countryside. In 50 years, its population has 
exploded from 500,000 to 6,000,000 and it can’t cope. The slum district of 
Kibera, a few kilometres from the business centre, houses 600,000 people, 
maybe a million: nobody knows. It is a dangerous, dirty place. There are no 
pavements, hardly any lighting and no sewers.
When the two countries gained their independence from Great Britain – 
Malaysia (still Malaya then) in 1957 and Kenya in 1963 – they still resembled 
one another. The former colonies in Asia and Africa took up the reins of 
independence at more or less the same time and, in many respects, they got 
off to a similar start. At the end of the 1950s, they were in the same stage of 
economic development. Average per capita income in Africa and Southeast Asia 
was virtually identical.
Between 1960 and 2000, sub-Saharan Africa has stumbled from one economic 
failure to another, while some parts of Asia have booked spectacular growth. 
Particularly in the last 30 years of the previous century, the growth figures 
continued to diverge. As late as 1980, average per capita income in Southeast 
Asia was lower than in sub-Saharan Africa; by 1993, it was twice as high. In 
Africa, the percentage of people living in poverty between 1990 and 2002 – 44 
per cent of the population – has remained unchanged against the backdrop of 
a rising population. In Southeast Asia, the poverty figure during the same period 
fell from 19 to 7 per cent.
So the World Bank’s reference to the ‘East Asian miracle’ in 1993 was well 
justified. The term was used to describe the eight high performing Asian 
economies: Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Indonesia. With the exception of Hong Kong and Japan, all the rapidly-
growing economies were newcomers. And five of them were in Southeast Asia. 
In just a few years, they multiplied their food production and created successful 
export industries. 
As these Asian Tigers started to roar in the 1980s, African exports were 
collapsing. What were the reasons behind this big difference? Was Africa failing 
to do something that Asia was doing right, or was it doing the same thing, but 
in the wrong way? Can Africa learn something from Asia? What actually gets 
development on the move? In 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
initiated – and earmarked funding for – an international study with the aim 
of finding answers to these questions. The project was appropriately called 
‘Tracking Development’.
From 2006 to 2011, an international group of researchers – from Africa, 
Southeast Asia and the Netherlands – made a comparative study of half a 
century of economic development in four countries in sub-Saharan Africa and 
four countries in Southeast Asia. They focused primarily on the policies adopted 
over that period. In addition, the Asians also looked at an African country, while 
the Africans scrutinised a country in Asia. They were looking for turning points in 
development – bends in the growth curves – and for factors that could explain 
them.
The African researchers were coached by political scientist Jan Kees van Donge, 
an Africa expert affiliated to the African Studies Centre in Leiden, and previously 
to the International Institute of Social Studies (in The Hague: it is now part of 
the Erasmus University in Rotterdam). The Asians received support from social 
geographer David Henley, who was a researcher with the Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) in 2006, and who is 
now a professor of Contemporary Indonesia Studies at Leiden University. 
At the outset of the programme, Jan Kees van Donge described his view of the 
thinking behind the project. ‘For Foreign Affairs, it’s mainly about coming up with 
new ideas for their own policy. Many states in Africa depend on development 
aid from the Netherlands and elsewhere. For example, 52 per cent of Tanzania’s 
budget is financed by foreign countries; in Uganda that figure is 48 per cent. It 
seems unlikely that this is sustainable.’
The spiritual father of the project is the historian Roel van der Veen, a diplomat 
with experience in Asia and Africa, the in-house academic at Foreign Affairs, and 
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a professor in Amsterdam and Groningen. Van der Veen admitted frankly at the 
start of the project that his ministry needed input for its Africa policy. ‘The aid so 
far has not produced much development. Our thinking shouldn’t get stuck in the 
African context because it doesn’t have much new to offer. So it’s a natural step 
to turn to the Asian success stories and look at the extent to which they can be 
used in Africa.’
* * *
THE TRACKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECT did not start off in a vacuum. 
Since the early 1990s, when the world realised how successful the Asian tigers 
were, people have been thinking a lot about why the Asians pulled it off, and 
Africa didn’t. 
In its report The East Asian Miracle (1993), the World Bank gave an explanation 
for the success of the tigers that has become an article of faith for donor 
countries. The countries in question had inflation under control. They nailed 
their exchange rates at a level that was good for exports. Their banking systems 
were operating effectively and that generated confidence in foreign investors. 
And they had even invested in education. The World Bank sketched a portrait 
of self-help and compared East Asia with Baron Von Münchhausen, who pulled 
himself out of the swamp by his own hair. A high internal savings ratio leads to 
investment, which leads in turn to economic growth, investment in education 
and the development of human capital. The tigers adopted exports as the 
goal, strategy and measure of development. Their first priority was: exports 
and integration in the global market. Western companies who moved their 
production activities en masse to low-wage countries in the 1980s went to 
Southeast Asia, not Africa. 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia have a lot in common, starting with 
their colonial past. Both areas are also in the tropics, with all the ecological and 
medical problems that implies. Over the course of time, both of them have 
been integrated in the global economy as producers of raw materials and 
agricultural products for the rich countries. And both economies are dominated 
commercially by ethnic minorities: the Lebanese in West Africa, Indians in the 
rest of Africa, and the Chinese in Southeast Asia.
But there are also major differences. Some researchers point to geographical 
factors that affect economic development, concluding that Africa is worse 
off than Southeast Asia in that respect. The British political economist Paul 
Collier focused, in his article Africa: Geography and Growth (2006) on Africa’s 
unfavourable physical and social geography. Collier breaks down countries into 
three categories: (1) resource-rich; (2) resource-scarce but coastal; and (3) 
resource-scarce and landlocked.
Globally, coastal countries without natural resources perform best. Landlocked, 
resource-scarce countries perform worst. In developing countries outside 
Africa, no fewer than 88 per cent of the population live in coastal countries with 
scarce natural resources. Eleven per cent live in resource-rich countries, and one 
per cent live in landlocked, resource-scarce countries. However, in Africa, the 
population is equally distributed over the three categories: only one third live in 
the most favourable category. Collier believes that this unfortunate distribution 
costs the continent 1 per cent growth annually.
Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa is thinly populated. It is home to 650 million 
people in an area of 20 million square kilometres. The population of Southeast 
Asia, which covers only 4 million square kilometres, is almost as big (550 million). 
Sub-Saharan Africa is split up into almost fifty states with small, ethnically highly 
diverse, populations. 
In 1997, World Bank economists William Easterly and Ross Levine developed an 
index for ethnic diversity: the probability that two randomly selected individuals 
in a single country will be members of the same ethnic group. Of the fifteen 
countries that scored lowest on this index – in other words, the most ethnically 
diverse countries – only one (India) was outside Africa. The authors calculated 
that 35 per cent of the difference in growth between Asia and Africa can be 
attributed to the difference in ethnic diversity. Greater diversity leads to more 
competition for natural resources, income and jobs with the government, 
possibly resulting in civil war. 
In 2000, Easterly wrote that this link between diversity and growth is partly 
determined by the quality of the government institutions: ‘Ethnic diversity has 
a more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when institutions are 
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poor. To put it another way, poor institutions have an even more adverse effect 
on growth and policy when ethnic diversity is high.’ In 2006, the American 
economist John Morell published a model study of development in Africa and 
Asia in the years 1950-1972. He explained the gap, which was expanding even 
back then, by – indeed – the difference in the quality of state institutions.
The formulae from the 1980s and 1990s from the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) amounted 
to free markets and a small state. Even so, more and more researchers have 
noted that the Asian states have been actively involved, for example by erecting 
protective barriers. The African failures, it is claimed, are largely attributable to 
the weakness of African states. 
 
Jan Kees van Donge suspected, at the outset of Tracking Development, that 
Africa’s biggest problem was to be found elsewhere. Agriculture, he told the 
NRC Handelsblad paper in October 2006, is Africa’s weak spot. ‘In recent years, 
growth has picked up slightly. But it is concentrated in export sectors with 
enclaves of relative prosperity: tourism, mining, fish farms and flower farms. 
They hardly stimulate the rest of the economy at all. And that rest consists of 
agriculture, a lot of agriculture.’
Support for his comments was not long in coming. Wageningen University 
organised a conference about the issue of ‘Development in Africa?’ on 10 
October 2007. Hans Eenhoorn was a lecturer in Wageningen on Food Security 
and Entrepreneurship and a member of the Taskforce on Hunger established by 
the former head of the UN, Kofi Annan. 
‘An industrial revolution like in Southeast Asia’, he said, ‘is not an option for 
Africa. The continent cannot compete with India and China in the coming 
decades. In Africa, the rural population, which currently accounts for more than 
two thirds of the continent’s inhabitants, will continue to be the majority for a 
long time into the future. Most people have access to land but the quality of the 
land is poor as a result of erosion, drought and exhaustion due to the repeated 
planting of the same crops. The same piece of land is split up into ever smaller 
sections as it is inherited. Raising smallholder productivity and improving access 
to the domestic market, which has been overrun by imported food, are the only 
ways to reduce hunger in Africa.’
The question is why this isn’t happening. Niek Koning, a lecturer on agricultural 
economics in Wageningen, blames this on the imposition of the liberalisation 
agenda by international donors, who prohibit African countries from protecting 
their own agriculture: ‘Tearing down tariff walls removes protection for farmers 
from falling global market prices. As a result, the agricultural societies get stuck 
in a downward spiral. Farmers have no margins to invest in sustainable land 
management. But that is what is needed when population pressure on land 
increases. That pressure leads to land degradation, which in turn pushes up 
poverty, reducing the margins for investment even further.’
In 2006, Van Donge put the blame for the stagnation in African agriculture 
mainly on politicians. ‘The political elite in Africa is not really interested in the 
countryside. Barring an isolated exception, such as Kenya, there is no policy. 
African leaders often build houses, villas or palaces in their home villages, but 
not farms. In a country like Ghana, the entire economy is focused on migration, 
on getting away. There is a widespread feeling in Africa that you have to get 
out of your village, out of your country, if you want to get ahead in life. Perhaps 
people want to get away because the countryside has so little to offer and that, 
in turn, is caused by the fact that the policy elite turns its back on the villages.’ 
There were more than enough ideas. The study could start.1  
* * *
1 The Tracking Development study produced a rich harvest. The coordinators Jan Kees 
van Donge and David Henley produced a special issue of the Development Policy Review 
(1/2012) with contributions from themselves, Peter Lewis, Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Ahmed 
Helmet Fuadi, Othieno Nyanjom and David Ong’olo. Four doctorate students from 
Africa and Asia worked their findings up into doctorate theses: Ahmad Helmet Fuady 
looked at elites and economic policy in Nigeria and Indonesia, 1966-1998; Blandina Kilama 
discussed the cashew industry in Tanzania and Vietnam; Bethuel Kinuthia examined foreign 
investment in Kenya and Malaysia; and Leang Un studied educational policies in Cambodia 
and Uganda. An anthology will appear soon with articles from all the participants, including 
Kheang Un and Akinyinka Akinyoade. The latter is affiliated to the African Studies Centre 
and is the Tracking Development Nigeria coordinator. The anthology will be edited and 
provided with an introduction by the project’s spiritual father Roel van Veen, the chairman 
of the Steering Group Bernard Berendsen, the director of the African Studies Centre Ton 
Dietz and a representative from the KITLV, Henk Schulte Nordholt. Development. 
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THE INITIATORS OF TRACKING Development had little difficulty in selecting 
the first pair of countries for a comparison of economic performance. Asia 
watchers and Africanists have been in agreement for some time on this issue: 
Indonesia and Nigeria are particularly suited for a comparison of this kind 
because they have a lot in common. 
They are both regional giants. Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia 
in terms of both surface area (1.9 million square kilometres) and population 
(230 million in 2009). Nigeria covers 933,000 square kilometres and, with 155 
million residents in 2009, it is the giant of West Africa. Indeed: it is the most 
populous country in Africa. No less than 39 per cent of the total population of 
the ten member states of the Association of Southeast-Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
lives in Indonesia. Nigeria is home to 47 per cent of all West Africans. Both 
countries have very large cities. The Indonesia capital Jakarta has more than 9.5 
million residents and Lagos, the economic metropolis of Nigeria, is home to 7.9 
million. Approximately half of all Indonesians and Nigerians live in cities: 51.5 and 
48.4 per cent respectively. 
Indonesia and Nigeria each carry a lot of weight in their own regions. Indonesia 
is the centre of gravity of the Southeast-Asian economies. In 2009, 31.2 per cent 
of foreign direct investment in all 10 ASEAN countries went to Indonesia and 
the nine others account for more than 28 per cent of investment in the largest 
member state. The ASEAN secretariat has its offices in Jakarta. Nigeria has a 
similar position in West Africa. It is undisputedly the largest economy in the 
region and it is first fiddle in the regional organisation, ECOWAS. 
The two countries are also comparable in terms of location and climate. 
Indonesia is an archipelago of 17,000 islands, 6,000 of which are inhabited. The 
long chain of islands straddles the Equator and the climate is damp and tropical 
throughout the country. Nigeria is also situated entirely in the tropics but there 
are variations in rainfall. The south has a tropical rainforest climate; the rest is 
predominantly savannah, from plains with tall grass and widely spaced trees in 
the middle of the country to Sahel savannah with shrub grasses and sand in the 
extreme north.
Both countries are extremely diverse, both ethnically and culturally. Nigeria is 
home to more than 200 ethnic groups and 500 languages are spoken in the 
country. The largest ethnic groups are the Yuruba in the southwest, the Igbo 
in the southeast and the Hausa-Fulani in the north. Together, they make up 68 
per cent of the Nigerian population. The dominant religions are Christianity 
(the faith of 48.2 per cent of the population, mainly Catholics, Anglicans and 
Methodists) and Muslims (50.4 per cent, mainly in the north). According to 
official statistics, only 1.4 per cent have other religions but, particularly in the 
predominantly Christian southeast, traditional beliefs are widespread.
Indonesia has more than 350 ethnic groups. The largest are the Javanese (45 per 
cent), Sundanese (14 per cent), Madurese (7.5 per cent) and coastal Malays (7.5 
per cent). The population is unevenly distributed across the archipelago: 57.5 per 
cent of Indonesians live on Java, traditionally the centre of political and economic 
power. There are tensions between the ethnic Chinese, who account for 3 per 
cent of the population and 70 per cent of the capital, and the rest. Indonesia 
recognises six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism 
and Confucianism. Approximately 90 per cent of the population are Muslims, 
which makes Indonesia the country with the largest Muslim population in the 
world.
In constitutional terms, Indonesia and Nigeria are both products of colonial 
powers. In 1800, the Netherlands inherited the territorial possessions of the 
bankrupt East India Company (VOC). In a series of military campaigns, such 
as the Java War (1825-1830) and the Aceh War (1873-1914), the Dutch 
united the extensive Indonesian archipelago, with its hundreds of larger and 
smaller princedoms, into a single colony: the Dutch East Indies. The defeat of 
the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) by the Imperial army of Japan 
in March 1942 signalled the start of an occupation that was to last three and 
a half years. After the Japanese surrender, Indonesian nationalists refused to 
accept the restoration of Dutch sovereignty and declared independence on 
17 August 1945. This was the beginning of four years of negotiations and 
military confrontation. Finally, in December 1949, the Netherlands relinquished 
sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RSI). 
In the pre-colonial era, the territory of what is now Nigeria was split up into 
different kingdoms: Bornu in the northeast, the Hausa and Fulani empires in the 
north, Benin in the south, Nri in the southeast and a number of small Yuruba 
empires in the southwest. In the early nineteenth century, British merchants 
2. Two oil-rich giants – Indonesia and Nigeria
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arrived in the Niger Basin. A Royal Charter dating from 1886 granted the 
Royal Niger Company the authority to set up an administration in the area 
and to regulate trade. In 1914, Britain united the various protectorates to form 
Colonial Nigeria. After World War II, there was a clamour for independence and, 
in 1954, Britain granted Nigeria self-government and the country became fully 
independent from the United Kingdom on 1 October 1960. 
Both Nigeria and Indonesia had a centralist government in the first half century 
of their independent existence. Nigeria is admittedly a federal state, but the 
states were, and continue to be, highly dependent on funding from the centre, 
especially since the arrival of oil prospecting in the Niger Delta, the proceeds 
from which flow directly into the coffers of the central government. Just one 
year after the transfer of sovereignty, the Indonesian federal state RSI, in which 
the states enjoyed considerable autonomy, made way for the unitary state 
of Republik Indonesia. It had a centralist government that remained in place 
until the fall of President Suharto in 1998. In 1999, the regencies, a level of 
government between the districts and the provinces, were granted extensive 
autonomy. 
Both countries had a long period of military government, or government 
dominated by the military. In Nigeria, this period lasted from 1966 to 1998, and 
was interrupted by five years of civil government only (1979-1983 and 1993). In 
the first four decades of its existence, Nigeria endured six successful and three 
failed military coups. Under the New Order (1966-1998), the Indonesian armed 
forces colluded with the President, former general Suharto, and the powerful 
civil service to play a leading role in the government of the country. It was only 
in 2000 that the military renounced their automatic representation at all levels 
of government.
Nigeria and Indonesia both have sizeable oil reserves. In the Dutch East Indies, 
the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company drilled the first major oil well in 1899 
near Perlak, Sumatra. Since then, oil has also been found in Kalimantan and 
Indonesia became a major oil producer. Shell, the Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company’s British partner, discovered the first valid oil field in the Niger 
Delta in 1956 and, in the 1970s, Nigeria became Africa’s largest oil-producing 
country. In both countries, the oil reserves are the property of the state and 
joint venture agreements with foreign oil companies are entrusted to state 
companies: the Indonesian company Pertamina (which was founded in 1957 
when President Sukarno nationalised the oil industry) and the Nigerian National 
Oil Corporation (NNOC, founded in 1971 after General Gowon partly 
nationalised the oil industry in Nigeria). State income increased spectacularly in 
both countries during the 1973 oil crisis. 
The two countries have something else in common: political elites abuse their 
positions of public power to line their own pockets. President Suharto’s regime 
built up a reputation in the 1980s for granting government work and other 
favours to the friends and family of the president, a practice referred to in 
Indonesia by three letters: KKN. In other words, ‘Korupsi (Corruption), Kolusi 
(Collusion), Nepotism’. Successive – generally military – regimes in Nigeria 
have also dipped into the state coffers for themselves, their friends and their 
supporters, and negotiated sizeable kickbacks from oil companies. On the 
basis of their scores on the international Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
Indonesia and Nigeria can reasonably be described as two of the most corrupt 
countries in the world.  
* * *
BECAUSE INDONESIA AND NIGERIA are so alike, it is striking that they have 
performed so differently in economic terms over the past four decades. In the 
1960s, Nigeria and Indonesia were a virtual match in terms of gross domestic 
product (GDP). The World Bank has stated that Nigerian GDP was actually 
rising faster than Indonesian GDP at that time: 5.07 per cent and 4.18 per cent 
respectively. After 1968, the figures started to diverge. Between 1968 and 1998, 
the Indonesian economy grew by 6-7 per cent annually, whereas Nigerian GDP 
increased by less than 4 per cent a year during those same 30 years. 
The per capita income (GDP divided by the number of inhabitants) in 
Nigeria was not only higher than in Indonesia in the 1960s, it was also rising 
faster : 2.6 per cent a year, as opposed to 1.9 per cent in Indonesia. But the 
roles were reversed after 1968. From that point onwards, per capita income in 
Indonesia started to rise faster, matching Nigeria in 1982. Between 1971 and 
1980, Indonesian per capita income rose by 5.4 per cent annually; the figure 
for Nigeria was 2 per cent. And the gap got ever wider: in the period 1981-
1990, per capita income in Nigeria fell by 1.5 per cent a year, whereas that of 
Indonesia continued to rise at an annual rate of 4.5 per cent.
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Growth figures and national average tell us little about income distribution. 
The contrasts are even more obvious when we look at the percentages of 
people in Indonesia and Nigeria living below the poverty line. According to the 
standards used by the World Bank, the poverty line is the income equivalent 
of 1 dollar per person per day. Anybody who has to manage with less is 
considered to be poor in absolute terms. The percentage of poor Indonesians 
has declined steadily since the 1970s. In 1970, 60 per cent of Indonesians – 
approximately 70 million people at the time – were living below the poverty 
line. In 1986, this percentage had fallen to 28 per cent; it had dropped to 17 
per cent in 1993 and then to 14 per cent in 1996. In Nigeria, the percentage of 
poor people has risen since 1970. According to the World Bank, 40-50 per cent 
of Nigerians were living in poverty between 1973 and 1985, and this figure rose 
to 66 per cent in 1986 and 78 per cent in 1996. 
 
A measure for development is change in the economic structure of a 
country, in other words in the percentage contribution made by agriculture, 
industry and the service sector to GDP, and in the range of goods exported. 
In the 1960s, Nigeria and Indonesia were both still agricultural countries; 
agriculture accounted for more than half of GDP. At the time, less than 15 
per cent of GDP came from industry. In the 1970s, the share of agriculture in 
the GDP of both countries fell to 31 per cent and the contribution made by 
industry grew accordingly. 
But this is where the similarity stops. Closer inspection shows that there were 
a number of major differences between the two economies. For example, 
Indonesian agriculture performed much better than its Nigerian counterpart in 
the 1970s. After the start of the oil boom in 1973, agriculture in Indonesia grew 
robustly by 4.5 per cent a year, whereas Nigerian agriculture failed to achieve 
even 1 per cent growth. In the African country, the expansion of the oil industry 
had a negative impact on agricultural performance.
There were also major differences between the two countries in the expanding 
secondary sector (mining and industry). In Nigeria, oil ruled the roost and 
manufacturing industry lagged behind, contributing only 5.3 per cent to GDP, 
less than one fifth of the secondary sector as a whole. Income from industrial 
products as a share of GDP continued to fall in the 1980s, reaching a level of 
less than 5 per cent in the first decade of this century. The Nigerian economy 
has been entirely dominated since the mid-1970s by the oil industry, which has 
remained the source since then of 90 per cent of export income. 
In Indonesia, the expanding role of the oil industry was accompanied by a rise in 
the production of industrial goods. In the 1990s, the latter accounted for more 
than half of the added value of the secondary sector. In 1991, exports of textiles, 
shoes and simple electronic goods made up the lion’s share of total exports, 
generating more revenue than oil exports. Since then, industrial products have 
contributed most to Indonesian GDP. The Indonesian economy has, since 1970, 
changed from an agricultural economy into an industrial and service one, while 
Nigeria has remained entrenched in its monoculture: oil.  
* * *
 
WHY DID NIGERIA NOT follow Indonesia’s example, failing to transform its 
oil riches into growth and reduce poverty in that way? Some analysts believe 
that this is a result of the weak Nigerian state. They claim that the ethnic 
divisions in the country and its political elite have resulted in fragmentation and 
instability. They postulate that, in the absence of a dominant ethnic group and 
political consensus, successive governments have been more concerned about 
keeping their grip on power and their share of public income – in other words, 
short-term interests – than about a long-term strategy to boost economic 
growth in the interests of the country as a whole. 
Tracking Development researchers Ahmad Helmet Fuady and David Henley 
do not believe that Nigerian institutions were responsible for the economic 
failures. They point out that the country, after the civil war with the secessionist 
Biafra (1967-1970), succeeded despite enormous ethnic diversity in maintaining 
national unity and that, in that respect, it has been as successful as the Indonesia 
of the New Order. Despite the economic meltdown of the 1980s, Nigeria has 
built a new and efficient capital: Abuja. 
Notwithstanding the numerous military coups, Fuady and Henley found 
considerable continuity in Nigeria’s political elite. For example, General Ibrahim 
Badamasi Babangida dominated Nigerian politics for 20 years before and after 
his coup in 1983, even though he stayed in the background after his resignation 
in 1993. President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was elected in 1999, was himself 
one of the military leaders of the country from 1976 to 1979, at a time when 
Babangida was a member of his High Military Council. Obasanjo’s campaign for 
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the presidency in 1999 was financed by this godfather of Nigerian politics. 
According to the same ‘institutional school’, which attributes Nigeria’s poor 
economic performance to weak state institutions, Indonesia owes its successes 
to three decades of political stability under Suharto’s New Order. During that 
time, an influential group of economists trained abroad, the ‘Berkeley mafia’, 
was able to steer a consistent course in economic policy. Thanks to his long-
undisputed position of power, Suharto was able to shelter these technocrats 
and prevent them from being subjected to political pressure by other players. 
And indeed, the technocrats did play a major role in developing economic 
policy in the years 1966-1998. Five of them were educated at the University of 
California in Berkeley, and two at the Netherlands School of Economics (NEH) 
in Rotterdam. The nestor was Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo (1917-2001), who 
came from old Javanese noble stock. Before World War II, he studied at the 
NEH and, in the 1950s, he trained a generation of economists at the Universitas 
Indonesia in Jakarta, including the later Berkeley boys. Some of the economists, 
including Widjojo Nitisastro (1927-2012), taught at the Indonesian Army Staff 
and Command School (Seskoad) in Bandung prior to the change of power 
in 1966. One of their students was Suharto. When he came to power, these 
economists were given key posts in his cabinets. 
But Nigeria also had a generation of economically educated technocrats and 
their careers more or less overlapped with those of their counterparts in 
Indonesia. Under the regime of General Yakubu Gowon, who took power in 
1966, a number of economists trained in Great Britain were given high-ranking 
civil service positions where they had more or less a free hand. They included 
Allison Ayida, Philip Asiodu, Oletunji Aboyade and Olu Falae. They did not keep 
their posts as long as the Indonesian Berkeley mafia because they were moved 
aside gradually after Gowon was deposed in a coup in 1975. Even so, many in 
the Nigerian elite shared their economic ideas and they continued to exert an 
influence, even under post-Gowon governments. 
It was when these Nigerian technocrats were determining policy in the 1970s 
that Nigeria and Indonesia began to diverge in terms of economic performance. 
The fact that Nigeria and Indonesia’s results were so different, say Fuady and 
Henley, was not the result of different political constellations but of major 
differences in policy. 
* * * 
THE POLICYMAKERS IN Indonesia and Nigeria had, first of all, very different 
priorities. That Indonesian GDP started, after a long period of stagnation, to 
rise in 1967, the year when General Suharto became president, and continued 
to rise by contrast with Nigeria was attributable to a pro-poor, pro-rural 
development strategy. That strategy was primarily aimed at boosting the 
productivity of peasant farming, the sector of the economy upon which most 
Indonesians depended for their livelihoods. 
In the 1970s, one third of the Indonesian development budget went to 
agriculture. Public resources were used to improve the irrigation system and 
new rice varieties became available with higher yields. Fertilisers and credit were 
highly subsidised. Furthermore, the state guaranteed a minimum price for the 
rice produced by all farmers. Between 1968 and 1985, yields per hectare rose 
by 80 per cent. In the 1960s, Indonesia was still the world’s largest importer of 
rice; by 1984, the country was self-sufficient. Indonesia financed investment in 
agriculture and rural areas from foreign aid first, and later from oil revenue too 
when it boomed after 1973.
The new agricultural technology was labour-intensive and it did not result 
in large numbers of small farmers being driven off the land. Tens of millions 
of farmers and land workers benefited. The rural economy as a whole was 
dragged out of the swamps of stagnation because the development that started 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s in rule all areas did not remain confined to 
agriculture. The government also invested in roads, electricity, schools and health 
care in the rural villages, which were home to 70 per cent of the population. 
The process of industrialisation based on exports that some economists 
now see as the key to Asian success was, in Indonesia, actually a secondary 
development that started only once growth had become firmly entrenched. 
Even in 1982, after fifteen years of sustained growth and poverty reduction, the 
production of industrial goods in Indonesia accounted for only 11 per cent of 
GDP and 3 per cent of exports. The trend of declining GDP was reversed in 
the direction of steady economic growth in the late 1960s, while export-driven 
industrialisation took off only in the mid-1980s. 
Once industrialisation actually got started, it moved fast. Henley and Fuady point 
out in this respect that this was a response from the private business sector 
to results from the preceding phase of development: macro-economic stability, 
personal saving and investment, a large domestic market and a reliable supply 
of affordable food for industrial workers. Once the economy as a whole started 
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to grow, private parties started to have confidence in the country. During 
the course of the 1980s, they started to invest in labour-intensive industries 
for exports: clothing, shoes and electronics. Ultimately, this labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry contributed to a significant extent to the reduction of 
poverty in Indonesia by creating employment for hundreds of thousands of 
workers, usually for low wages. However, industrialisation only really took off 
when widespread poverty in rural areas had been pushed back by agricultural 
growth. Indonesia made most progress in combating poverty in the 1970s and 
the early 1980s, before there was any question of an export industry. 
In one article, Henley sets out the two principles for successful development 
planning adopted by the Indonesian technocrats. 
The first principle amounted to the following: development is above all a 
question of numbers and the most effective policy is what provides direct 
material benefits for the largest number of people. Widjojo Nitisastro, the leader 
of the Indonesian technocrats, provided an explanation in the First Five Year 
Plan (1967-1972) for the New Order of why efforts were concentrated on 
agriculture. It was very simple: the majority of Indonesians lived from agriculture, 
either as smallholders or as landless farm workers. Agricultural development 
raised the income of the majority of the Indonesian population and therefore 
led to an increase in national income. Widjojo and his colleagues started with 
‘shared growth’. Large swathes of the population benefit directly from economic 
growth and do not need to wait until the benefits from the activities of the rich 
‘trickle down’. 
The second principle was: fast results. The Indonesian planners realised that 
what matters at an early stage of development is not long-term planning but a 
deliberate concentration on short-term goals. Widjojo and his colleagues did 
not look beyond the ongoing five year plan during the 1970s. And that first 
plan was so sketchy that it did not include any targets at all for growth, saving or 
investment. Their primary focus was on sticking with the priorities that had been 
set. And their first priority was agriculture, in Widjojo’s words ‘the central arena 
in which all efforts are concentrated and results expected’. 
Fuady and Henley described the contrast with the Nigerian approach as 
‘dramatic’. Successive governments there saw ‘development’ primarily as rapid 
industrialisation to get ahead of backward agriculture. In Nigeria, the share of 
agriculture in the development budget fell from 10 per cent in the Second 
National Development Plan (1970-1974) to 6 per cent in the third National 
Development Plan (1975-1980), which benefited hugely from oil revenue. 
Government investment in industry amounted to 16 per cent. Nigeria’s priority 
was not agriculture, but industrialisation. The oil boom of the 1970s generated 
the resources needed to realise the planners’ industrial visions. And they were 
able to go their own way because the military shielded them. 
 
While Indonesia was spending its oil dollars in the 1970s on labour-intensive 
agriculture, Nigeria was using its oil revenue for capital-intensive industrial 
projects, including an enormous steel factory that has never produced any steel. 
Even when they produced something, these new industries employed very few 
people. They were like cathedrals in the desert. The theory was that they would 
result in more growth by stimulating other sectors of the economy and acting 
as ‘growth poles’. But the planners did not really expect this to happen quickly. 
The Nigerian technocrats were primarily interested in added value, transferring 
technology and the Nigerian share in industrial investment. They based their 
thinking on the ‘trickle-down effect’ of industrial megaprojects, not on shared 
growth. They were not interested in the relationship between industrialisation 
and combating poverty. They accepted the fact that the gap between the rich 
and the poor would increase as their ambitious projects went ahead. That was, 
in the words of one of them, Allison A. Ayida, ‘ the price of rapid development’. 
Henley believes that this, in somewhat simplified terms, is what the difference in 
thinking between the Indonesian and Nigerian planners in the 1970s amounts 
to. The Indonesians saw development as a process that would result in poorer 
people getting richer, whereas Nigerians saw development as a process of 
transformation in which poor countries acquire things that rich countries 
have, and poor countries haven’t. The Nigerian planners saw heavy industry 
and higher education as talismans of development. They believed that you 
needed them to develop. Their point of reference was an idealised form of 
‘modernity’, in other words industrial modernity, the desirable destination of 
the development process. The Indonesians, argues Henley, had another point of 
reference: the grim reality of rural poverty, the undesirable point of departure 
for the development process. This could only be tackled at root, using available 





WHY DID THE INDONESIA of the New Order grant priority to farmers 
and rural areas, while the Nigerian government opted for industry and the 
cities? There are three explanations in circulation: (1) social pressure; (2) the 
social background of the political elites and (3) the intellectual baggage of the 
technocrats. 
 
The first explanation argues that the political realities of the 1960s forced the 
military powers in Indonesia to take the interests of smallholders seriously. 
The communist party of Indonesia, the PKI, depended on the support of the 
Javanese rural poor and seriously threatened to become the largest party in the 
mid-1960s until it was crushed by the military in 1965. The development plans 
for rural areas served, in this view, to neutralise the appeal of political radicalism 
and therefore to safeguard the power of the elite. 
The fact that the military in Nigeria did not feel any need to combat rural 
poverty may be due to the absence of any significant party in Nigerian politics 
that acted in the interests of the farmers. Rural Nigeria, and rural Africa in 
general, does not play any role in the political calculations of the elite. It was – 
and still is – ‘outside the public arena’. In that respect, Nigeria follows the African 
pattern in which governments see their power threatened primarily by unrest 
in the cities and conflicts within the elite, which generally erupt in the form of 
military coups, rather than by political activities involving farmers. African elites, in 
this first view, attune their policies to the interests of urban lobbies: civil servants, 
workers in state companies, unions and the armed forces. 
Suharto, who was Indonesia’s strong man for more than thirty years, was the 
son of a Javanese farmer and he was fond of parading that fact. During his 
period in office, there were life-sized posters of the president as the ‘Father 
of Development’, wearing a hat of weaved bamboo and carrying a sickle and 
sheaves of rice. Nigerian rulers also have close links to the villages. In the 1970s, 
a survey in western Nigeria showed that 56 per cent of politicians and 59 per 
cent of civil servants were from farming families. Olusegun Obasanjo, who led 
Nigeria from 1976 to 1979 and from 1999 to 2007 was, like Suharto, a farmer’s 
son. 
But that background is not particularly significant. Talking to his ghost writers G. 
Iwipayana and Ramadan K.H., Suharto shamelessly dwelt on memories of his 
childhood years: riding on the back of a water buffalo and playing in the mud of 
the paddy fields. Later, as president, he only really seemed to be in his element 
during working visits to the countryside. On those occasions, he would talk 
spontaneously to the drummed-up groups of farmers about the latest fertilisers 
and rice varieties. By contrast, Obasanjo’s biography exudes an air of disdain for 
his village roots. ‘His father’, writes his biographer Onukaba A. Ojo, ‘wanted his 
children to escape the drudgery that was peasant farming in Africa. (…) On 
their way home from the farm one day, Obasanjo said to his son: “Olu, is it this 
toilsome farming you would want to continue with in life?’ ... ‘Would you like to 
learn a trade?’” He answered: ‘Motor mechanic.’ 
Nor do the university backgrounds of the Indonesian and Nigerian technocrats 
provide a solution. The Berkeley-educated Indonesians primarily had a technical 
and practical view of national economies. As one of them, Mohammad Sadli, put 
it, their thinking was primarily pragmatic: what was good was what worked. In 
so far as they had been exposed to philosophical and political-economic ideas, 
they were mainly inclined to the left. When the Indonesian technocrats were 
studying in Berkeley, the Greek socialist Andreas Papandreou ruled over the 
Economics Department. Nevertheless, little could be seen of his influence once 
they became ministers. 
The most influential Nigerian technocrats, Ayida and Asiodu, studied Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics in Oxford, a degree that prepares students for a 
career in public service. Benazir Bhutto and Aung San Suu Kyi also graduated 
from the same department. The curriculum covered political economics and 
that may have imbued the Nigerians with the idea that state power is needed 
to change existing property relationships and patterns of behaviour. Other 
Nigerian technocrats were also exposed during their studies in England to left-
wing ideas about the need for state intervention. But that is also true of Sumitro, 
the grand old man of the Indonesian economists. In Rotterdam, he studied under 
Professor Jan Tinbergen, a social democrat who, in 1934, was one of the authors 
of the Labour Plan and who was the first director of the Dutch Central Planning 
Office after the war. Even so, Sumitro and his pupils at the Universitas Indonesia 





ALL THESE FACTORS MAY have played a role in the policy decisions made 
by the rulers of Indonesia and Nigeria. Nevertheless, Tracking Development 
researchers Fuady and Henley believe the most important is the wide gap in 
the personal backgrounds of Indonesian and Nigerian policymakers and the 
different lessons they adopted as a result. 
The Indonesians went through the school with the hardest knocks. In the 
1950s and 1960s, they faced the derailing of the Indonesian economy under 
Sukarno, the country’s first president. He was a wily power politician and a 
gifted populist, but he knew nothing about economics. In 1957, he nationalised 
all Dutch companies, from plantations and sugar factories to banks and shipping 
lines, transformed them into state companies and imposed a permit system 
on international trade. His governments systematically spent more than they 
earned, particularly on national prestige projects, but not on services and 
infrastructure. The rupiah, the national currency, was overvalued by a factor 
ten. Smuggling, black market and corruption flourished and poverty took on 
terrifying dimensions. In the mid-1960s, Indonesia was plagued by hunger and 
hyper-inflation. By that time, it had become the world’s largest rice importer and 
per capita income was lower than in 1930. Soemitro, Widjojo and their younger 
colleagues looked on, and concocted a way out of the crisis.
Since independence, Nigeria had not been faced by an economic crisis of similar 
proportions, despite three years of civil war (1967-1970). The country was 
less densely populated, it had more fallow agricultural ground than Indonesia, 
and no shortage of food. The overvaluation of the naira and state control of 
trade in agricultural products had not benefited exports, and high tariff walls 
to protect the new domestic industry pushed up prices. Even so, despite the 
high price of oil, Nigeria had no budget deficit or problems with declining 
infrastructure in the 1970s. As a result, the effects of policy did not get planners 
concerned. When the oil price collapsed in the 1980s, stagnating growth was 
blamed on over-spending, market vagaries and corruption, not on the adopted 
development strategy. The only problem, it was thought, was that the strategy 
was not being implemented in the right way. 
Fuady and Henley arrive at a different conclusion in their comparative study. The 
policy decisions taken by the two countries in about 1970 were responsible for 




THE INTRODUCTION has already described how Kenya and Malaysia, two 
former British colonies, started their independent existence in comparable 
circumstances. In the 1960s, their economies remained in step. But in the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s, the trajectories diverged further and further. Malaysia 
was more successful than Kenya in combating rural poverty. The government in 
Nairobi did not back the masses of poor farmers, who required most attention, 
but put its money on a small group of ‘progressive‘ agricultural entrepreneurs. 
The Malaysian efforts to improve rural conditions were more successful, but 
focused less on improvements in food crops than in Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur 
placed the long-turn emphasis on palm oil, and production for export.
The under-performance of Kenya is often attributed to governance weaknesses 
such as corruption and nepotism. Malaysia’s superior economic achievements 
were, it has been suggested, due to the country’s ability to clamp down on the 
abuse of public office. Researcher Jan Kees van Donge conducted a comparative 
study for Tracking Development of Kenyan and Malaysian performance and 
arrived at a slightly different conclusion. He discovered that Malaysia was also 
afflicted by institutional shortcomings, such as the practices referred to there 
as ‘money politics’, with intimate relationships between politics and business. 
But Malaysia was able to limit the damage thanks to the revenue from oil. Oil 
not only provided the necessary investment resources, it also enhanced the 
country’s credit rating, allowing it easier access to the international money 
markets. Kenya, Malaysia’s counterpart in Tracking Development, lacked these 
rich resources and had difficulty in finding sources of foreign financing. The 
difference between Malaysian and Kenyan performance, says Van Donge, isn’t a 
question of good governance and bad governance but, in highly simplified terms, 
of credit or a lack of it. 
* * *
IN KENYA AND MALAYSIA, Marxist or radical socialist ideas never took root 
among the policy elite. After independence, state companies were established 
but governments preferred free enterprise; private ownership of the means of 
production was the norm. There was some state intervention in the economy 
in both countries. In Kenya, trade in agricultural products was managed by 
government authorities. And in the 1970s, Malaysia launched its New Economic 
Policy (NEP), a form of affirmative action favouring the largest ethnic group, the 
Malays. The thinking behind that policy was that a counterbalance was needed 
to offset the economic dominance of the Chinese minority. Malays were given 
cheap shares and credit. A similar programme was a feature of the Kenyan 
landscape, where the government tried to encourage the formation of a Kenyan 
business class alongside the enterprising Asian minority. The programme was 
particularly beneficial for the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu. Nevertheless, 
the two countries corrected state intervention from time to time by means of 
deregulation and privatisation. Foreign investors have always been welcome in 
both Kenya and Malaysia. 
Despite occasional outbursts of political unrest, the two countries were 
relatively stable. Kenya had just two presidents in the first four decades of its 
existence: Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1979) and Daniel Arap Moi (1979-2003). 
The history of the Federation of Malaysia has been dominated by two prime 
ministers: Abdul Rahman (1957-1969) and Mahathir Mohamed (1981-2003). For 
40 years, the two countries were de facto one-party states. In Kenya, the Kenyan 
African National Union (KANU) held the reins of power without a break until 
2001. Malaysia has parties organised on ethnic lines. Since 1957, power has been 
held by a coalition of the United Malays’ National Organization (UMNO), the 
largest party of Malays, and the Chinese and Indian political organisations. 
Despite these similarities, economic progress in the two countries has been very 
different indeed. Since independence, the Malaysian economy has expanded 
exponentially, with the exception of brief intervals in the mid-1980s and during 
the Asian crisis of 1997. Average growth between 1961 and 2009 was 6.4 per 
cent. In Kenya, economic growth flattened out at the same level (4.6 per cent) 
after a promising start in the 1960s, with a peak at the height of the coffee 
boom in 1971 and an all-time low – with the economy shrinking by 4.7 per cent 
– after the outbreak of the oil crisis (1973). 
* * *
VAN DONGE EXAMINED the histories of the two countries to see whether 
he could identify any turning points in economic development, looking for 
factors that might explain the discrepancy in performance. He looked first at 
gross investment. In the years 1981-1990, it accounted for 30 per cent of GDP 
in Malaysia and 20 per cent in Kenya. In the next ten years, the gap grew: to 36 
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and 17 per cent respectively. This slow-down in investment suggests that Kenya 
had fewer and fewer sources of financing and that, as a result, growth stagnated. 
The pattern in Malaysia was the reverse. 
Both countries relied heavily on foreign loans to finance their economic growth 
– alongside domestic economies, assistance and direct foreign investment. The 
result was increasing foreign debt as a proportion of GDP. In Malaysia, that 
percentage began to fall to a manageable level in 1988 – from 75.6 per cent in 
1987 to 55.7 per cent – whereas it continued to rise in Kenya to no less than 
131.9 per cent in 1993, after which there was a slight reduction. 
The pattern is similar for debt servicing (interest and repayments) as a 
proportion of income from exports. In Malaysia, this figure fell to well below 
10 per cent after 1986 but persisted at a level in excess of 20 per cent until 
1993 in Kenya. This does not mean that Malaysian debt was reduced in absolute 
terms. In the years 1985-1995, long-term debt almost doubled, while Kenya’s 
foreign debt rose by 55 per cent over the same period. Malaysia therefore 
had much more credit abroad than Kenya. The difference becomes even more 
pronounced if we turn to the size of the populations of the two countries. In 
1965, they both had 9 million inhabitants. In 1993, the population of Kenya had 
risen to 26 million and that of Malaysia to 19.5 million. In the period 1988-1993 
– when the debt positions started to diverge – per capita debt in Kenya was 
USD 195, contrasting sharply with the individual debt of Malaysians of USD 865. 
Malaysia was in a position to borrow more than Kenya, and it did so. 
This seems contradictory: the debt-service obligations of Malaysia fell as a 
percentage of export income and GDP even though the debt increased in 
absolute terms. But this paradox is actually the key to Malaysia’s success: the 
economy was pushed into a virtuous spiral in which rising debt-servicing was 
paid from growth. This was a feature of the mid-1980s in particular, when 
Kenya’s debt rose to very high GDP percentages. At that point, the Malaysian 
economy was starting to grow rapidly, strengthening its international position: 
the financial world was confident that growth would continue – and credit is a 
question of confidence. 
In Kenya, exactly the opposite happened: the economy moved into a downward 
spiral because debt servicing was swallowing up an excessive proportion of 
export income. And the size of the debt handicapped Kenya in its efforts to 
obtain more long-term loans. As a result, in the mid-1980s, it had to turn to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
Of course, countries do not rely exclusively on foreign loans to finance their 
development spending. Another important source of financing is development 
aid. Kenya received much more aid than Malaysia. If we look at aid received as 
a percentage of GDP, Kenya received an average of 9.5 per cent a year in the 
1980s, compared with Malaysia’s 0.6 per cent. In the years 1980-1994, aid to 
Malaysia was minor compared with Kenya, which, at that time, was receiving an 
annual USD 30.6 in aid per capita. The per capita amount received by Malays 
was USD 12.6.
Another source of investment is income from natural resources. The Kenyan 
resources in that respect are limited because the country has no mineral 
stocks of significance, whereas Malaysia’s oil reserves generated income for 
that country of USD 133 per capita in the years 1982-1994. Furthermore, oil 
exports had a beneficial effect on the Malaysian balance of trade and payments. 
Between 1980 and 1994, Malaysia had an average surplus on the balance of 
trade of 5.8 per cent of GDP. Without oil, that would have been an annual 
deficit of 1 per cent. That positive trade balance had a favourable impact, in 
turn, on the ratio of debt servicing to exports and that is a factor that enhances 
a country’s creditworthiness. During that same period, Malaysia repaid debts 
annually to a tune that exceeded its revenue from oil exports. 
And during those years, Kenya had an annual trade deficit amounting to 7.1 per 
cent of GDP. The difference with the Malaysian surplus of 5.8 per cent was no 
less than 12.9 per cent. 
Van Donge calculated the difference there would have been if Kenya had 
benefited from comparable oil income. The calculations took the difference 
in the size of the two economies into account; Kenya’s economy is much 
smaller than Malaysia’s and the hypothetical Kenyan oil sector was required to 
account for a share in the economy that was comparable to its actual Malaysian 
counterpart. The calculation indicated that, during the period in question, Kenya 
would have had a modest trade surplus: 1.4 per cent of GDP. The imaginary 
oil exports would have generated extra income for Kenya of 618 million US 
dollars; actual debt servicing amounted to 506 million dollars over that period. 
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The oil income of Malaysia also helped to balance the budget. Between 1980 
and 1994, that income accounted for 20 per cent of government revenue, 
while the country had a budget shortfall averaging 0.4 per cent of GDP over 
the same period. Without oil, that deficit would have been much bigger : 5.1 per 
cent of GDP. Without the oil income, it would have been much more difficult to 
keep inflation low and stabilise the exchange rate of the ringgit, the Malaysian 
dollar. So oil was the bedrock of both monetary and exchange rate policy. 
If Kenya had actually had Van Donge’s hypothetical oil sector, it would have 
boosted not only the balance of trade on payments, but also public finances. 
During the period under consideration, 1980-1994, Kenya had an average 
budget deficit of 4.2 per cent of GDP. The hypothetical oil income would have 
provided Kenya with a modest average surplus of 1.3 per cent between 1980 
and 1992. During the latter half of those years, Kenya’s debt burden actually 
became unsustainable. 
Van Donge’s comparison brings him to the provisional conclusion that access 
to financing largely explains the difference between stagnation in Kenya 
and ongoing growth in Malaysia. It explains above all the divergent growth 
trajectories after 1985, when Kenya entered a downward spiral of problems 
with its balance of payments and low growth, and Malaysia picked up the 
spiral of expanding credit and accelerating growth. Malaysia’s spiral was fuelled 
primarily by its oil, asserts Van Donge. Even so, he recognises that neither oil nor 
credit are adequate explanations for growth. 
* * *
MINERAL RESOURCES can be both a blessing and a curse. Development 
literature even uses the term ‘resource curse’: a combination of rich mineral 
resources and low growth. Governing elites can be tempted by revenues 
from oil or minerals to turn to rent seeking. This is the unproductive use of 
government positions and schemes. In economic terms: value is extracted 
from a resource (for the classical economist David Ricardo, this was land) 
without compensation and without contributing to productivity. In short, fast 
profits without enhancing prosperity. For example, governments fail to invest in 
establishing the institutions that strengthen the state, such as an adequate tax 
system, and instead allow state institutions to grow in order to meet demand 
for jobs from their own supporters. Development literature often claims that 
Malaysia escaped from this curse as a result of the quality of its institutions. 
Access to financing, we read, depends on strong institutions and productive 
economic policy, regardless of whether a country has rich mineral resources. 
In its report The East Asian Miracle (1993) the World Bank devotes a chapter 
to Malaysia in which it claims that economic policies that furthered confidence 
were the reason for Malaysia’s generous access to foreign credit. And, in a study 
from 2008, five development economists, including the Tanzanian Benno Ndulu 
and the Brit Paul Collier, argue that shortcomings in governance constituted the 
main obstacles to economic growth in Africa. They do not mention access to 
financing. 
Did Malaysia perform so much better than Kenya thanks to the quality of 
its institutions, which ensured that the country made sensible use of its oil 
resources, escaping the ‘resource curse’ as a result? Or did Malaysia prosper so 
much because the country, in part because of its oil, had much more generous 
access to financing than Kenya?
Many politicologists and economists blame the economic decline of Kenya on 
inappropriate political meddling with the economy and poor governance. They 
seek the causes in Kenya’s political system: parties are primarily ethnic coalitions 
that are kept together by handing out jobs, bribes and unproductive investments 
that generate short-term profits only. In Kenya, appointment to public office 
creates obligations, not so much to an anonymous public as to the people who 
have made the appointment possible and to the civil servant or politician’s 
own ethnic and/or regional supporters. Public resources are not thought of 
as community possessions but as a pork barrel for officials that they can use 
to strengthen their networks and positions of power. This is a pattern that is 
thought to frighten off foreign investors.
Cashing in on public office and collusion between politicians, civil servants and 
entrepreneurs are well-established traditions in Kenya. Even back in the 1960s, 
the court of President Kenyatta was the place where favours were handed out. 
Financial institutions were always subject to political pressure and government 
bodies established to promote Kenyan enterprise were crippled by large non-
performing loans granted to friendly, but dubious debtors. 
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In the early 1990s, the Kenyan economy went through its most severe crisis 
and there was certainly a link to machinations at the highest level. The macro-
economic problems were partly a result of the Goldenberg scandal. A Kenyan 
company, Goldenberg International, that had been founded by a prominent 
businessman, diverted a government programme intended to earn foreign 
currency. Kenya grants fiscal facilities and, in some cases, export subsidies to 
companies that focus on exports. Exporters housing their dollar income with 
the central bank were given the equivalent value in Kenyan shillings, plus 20 
per cent, by the government. Goldenberg reported fictitious gold exports as a 
way of extracting money from the public purse. In practice, between 1991 and 
1993, the company actually obtained a bonus of no less than 35 per cent on its 
foreign exchange income. Kenya has just one operational goldmine and it is not 
a significant exporter of gold. So the scheme included importing gold from the 
neighbouring countries of Congo and Tanzania, which was then exported legally. 
It is entirely possible that, in fact, only minimal amounts of gold were exported. 
Members of Arap Moi’s government and leading civil servants working for the 
central bank were involved in this scam, and they also shared in the profits. 
According to a committee of enquiry, the affair cost the Kenyan state 800 
million US dollars and it had disastrous consequences for the economy. To cap 
it all, it coincided with the elections of 1992, during which Arap Moi’s regime 
pumped billions of shillings into the economy, resulting in hyperinflation in 1993. 
Industries were forced to close because of their debts with the banks as a result 
of price rises and a vicious rate of interest, the result, in turn, of large domestic 
loans taken out by the state to remove excess money from the economy. Those 
measures generated even more problems for the real economy. 
In Kenya, the state is no match for wily elites looking to make a buck for 
themselves. However, the state in Malaysia also has its weaknesses. There, the 
boundary between the public and private sectors has been blurred by what 
is known there as ‘money politics’. The many non-performing loans in Malaysia 
show that credit is often not granted for economic, but for political, reasons. It 
all started with a government programme intended to transform Malays, the 
largest ethnic group that traditionally had the smallest share in the economy, 
into successful entrepreneurs. 
After the serious race riots in 1969, the governing party UMNO launched the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) with the aim of emancipating the Malays. The 
NEP was intended to give the bumiputra (the sons of the Earth, the ‘native’ 
population) the opportunity to catch up with the enterprising Chinese, who 
dominated the economy. The aim was that the Malays would have a share of 
30 per cent in the national economy within twenty years. They were given 
access to cheap credit, shares were offered almost free and quota systems 
were established giving them a fixed number of places at institutions of higher 
education. Foreign companies operating largely on the domestic market were 
required to grant 30 per cent of shares to Malays. 
To manage the shares of the economically inexperienced Malays, ‘bumiputra’ 
holding companies were set up that were managed by government, effectively 
the governing party, the UMNO. In the absence of a native business class, the 
UMNO acted as the collective minder, guardian and patron of the Malays. 
Individuals sold their shares to settle debts, or because of a lack of business 
interest or talent, and the new riches accumulated in the bumiputra holding 
companies. As a result ‘native’ capital was gradually entrusted to a small new 
elite. In the first half of the 1980s, UMNO-controlled holding companies 
invaded the corporate sector (which was primarily in Chinese hands). Backed 
up by loans from state banks, government contracts and blocks of shares 
awarded to them, they gained control over some of the country’s largest listed 
concerns. A spectacular example of nepotism, Malaysian-style. 
Bank Negara Malaysia, the national bank, set the percentage of loans that had 
to be granted to Malays. That percentage increased from 4 per cent of the total 
number of approved bank loans in 1968 to 28 per cent in 1985. The ‘native’ 
share in the economy expanded thanks to the NEP and the economic growth 
in the 1970s fuelled by the development of the oil industry and rising foreign 
investment. 
The NEP resulted in a larger public sector and a bureaucracy that had more 
favours to grant than ever. Another result was the emergence of the New 
Malays, no longer dressed in sarongs, but in tailored suits; no longer village 
teachers, but economists and accountants. A new class of businessmen who 
depended on their UMNO connections. The New Malay is not a businessman 
interested in risk but a rent-seeker: he acquires government orders without 
open tenders, is first in the queue when state companies are privatised, receives 
loans and subsidies with soft conditions, and enjoys political patronage. 
The bumiputra holding companies regularly got into difficulties as a result of 
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inefficient and parasitic business practices, and had to be bailed out by strong 
state companies. Petronas in particular, the oil company in which the state has 
a 75 per cent stake, had to intervene frequently. The most spectacular bail-
out was for Bank Bumiputra, which had been Malaysia’s largest bank since the 
mid-1980s. It got into financial difficulties because a subsidiary, BMF, had major, 
non-performing loans outstanding as a result of property speculation in Hong 
Kong in the early 1980s. A swindler in Hong Kong had tricked people into 
making major investments in dubious, or non-existent, real estate. Two Malaysian 
members of the BMF board had teamed up with the swindler. Bank Bumiputra 
also suffered painful losses when it had to save the skin of a political friend of 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed by taking over his shares in a bankrupt bank 
at a high price. Bank Bumiputra then had to be kept afloat with major cash 
injections from the sizeable Petronas coffers. The oil company was the owner of 
the bank from 1985 to 1990. 
* * *
VAN DONGE DRAWS two conclusions from the governance shortcomings in 
Kenya and Malaysia. In the first place, the weaknesses appear to be very similar 
and they would appear to have had a major macro-economic impact in both 
countries. Economic growth in Kenya over the period 1990-1995, the time of 
the Goldenberg affair and its aftermath, was weak. Growth in Malaysia was also 
relatively low between 1985 and 1990, when the Bank Bumiputra scandal was 
a factor. In the years about 1990, both countries saw their debt burden increase 
as a percentage of GDP, and their budget deficits also rose. 
Secondly, there is little reason to see Malaysia as a country that is exceptionally 
well governed, or Kenya as exceptionally badly governed. They both suffer from 
governance problems that have a negative economic impact. The big difference 
is that Malaysia managed to surmount the problems, while Kenya did not. In 
Malaysia, it was possible to limit the damage through the intervention of the 
state oil company Petronas. Malaysian oil was of crucial significance for public 
finances in a more general sense. In short, Malaysia could permit itself the 
indulgence of weaknesses in governance because of the availability of generous 
public resources.
Even so, there are differences between Malaysia and Kenya in terms of the 
vulnerability of their public institutions. In Malaysia, one government body was 
able to evade inappropriate political pressure. Petronas remained an enclave of 
efficiency and was therefore able to play a role in limiting the economic damage 
when other institutions succumbed to the temptations of ‘rent-seeking’. The 
role of the central bank was also different in the two countries. Bank Negara 
Malaysia kept well away from political manoeuvring, maintaining strict financial 
discipline over the years, and so Malaysia had a stable exchange rate. 
The Central Bank of Kenya, by contrast, was at the heart of the Goldenberg 
affair which inflicted so much damage to the country’s economy in the early 
1990s. Government bodies responsible for trading in agricultural products, 
which are strategic institutions in a country that depends on agricultural exports, 
were also frequently used as pork barrels by Kenya’s civil servants. 
* * *
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THE THIRD COUNTRY PAIR compared in the Tracking Development project 
– Tanzania and Vietnam – was selected for different reasons than the first two. 
Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and Malaysia followed a capitalist development strategy 
from the 1960s onwards, with predominantly private ownership of the means of 
production. Tanzania and Vietnam (North and South) both opted for a socialist 
course, in which state institutions were the motor of economic growth, as soon 
as the countries achieved independence in 1961 and 1954 respectively. In the 
1980s, both countries got into difficulties when agricultural production – and 
therefore economic growth – stagnated and foreign exchange reserves were 
no longer adequate to finance imports. As a result, Tanzania and Vietnam started 
down the path of reform in about 1986, and liberalised their economies. The 
role of the state was rolled back in favour of private initiative. 
The results achieved by the two countries with these reforms were very 
different in terms of growth, balance of trade and payments, agricultural 
production, food security and poverty alleviation. In 1988, in the early days of 
the reforms, per capita GDP in Tanzania was higher than in Vietnam: USD 255 
and 210 respectively. From that point onwards, Vietnam caught up and, by 2006, 
per capita income in Vietnam was USD 575 as against USD 334 in Tanzania. The 
researchers led by Jan Kees van Donge looked at whether this divergence in 
economic development trajectories was caused by policy differences or other 
factors. 
 * * *
TANZANIA AND VIETNAM have both similarities and differences. They both 
have a colonial past. Tanzania resulted from the merger in 1964 of Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar. Prior to 1918, Tanganyika was a part of German East Africa before 
becoming a British colony until independence in 1961. Zanzibar, at one time 
an enclave of Arabian slave traders, was formally ruled by the sultan of Oman 
until the merger. The undisputed leader of Tanzania was Julius Nyerere (1922-
1999), a chief ’s son who graduated in economics and history at the University 
of Edinburgh in 1952. He was the first president of Tanzania from 1961 until he 
voluntarily stepped down in 1986. 
Vietnam was an independent kingdom until it was annexed by French Indochina 
in 1887. During World War II, the French Vichy regime handed over Indochina 
to Japan, Nazi Germany’s ally. The Japanese occupation saw the emergence 
of a nationalist and communist resistance movement opposing Japan and the 
French. After the French army had been defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 by 
the left-wing nationalist Viet Minh, Vietnam was split into two at the Conference 
of Geneva: North Vietnam under the communist leader Ho Chi Minh (1890-
1969) and South Vietnam under Emperor Bao Dai. After the withdrawal of the 
American troops from South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese People’s Army 
moved into the South Vietnamese capital Saigon in 1975 and Vietnam was re-
united under Communist rule. 
Both Tanzania and the re-united Vietnam are predominantly agricultural 
countries; most of the population live from farming. The staple crop in Vietnam is 
rice and most agricultural land depends on irrigation. In Tanzania, the staple crop 
is maize, which is cultivated extensively and depends on rainfall. 
Tanzania and Vietnam both subjected agriculture to a socialist experiment, each 
in their own way. In the 1950s, Ho Chi Minh had implemented radical land 
reform in the north, resulting in the deaths of thousands of feudal landowners 
and prosperous farmers. After Vietnam was re-united, farmers were also 
organised in cooperatives in the country’s rice barn in the southern Mekong 
Delta, and the rice trade was taken over by state companies.
In 1967, President Nyerere, in the Arusha Declaration, set out the principles 
of his development strategy for Tanzania: African socialism (in Swahili Ujamaa: 
familyhood, solidarity) and self-reliance. Instead of focusing on urban society 
and industrialisation, he opted for rural society and agriculture. The diffuse rural 
population was required to live closer together in larger villages so that they 
would have easier access to modern facilities such as education, health care 
and good drinking water. They were to be connected to the rest of the country 
through links to the road network. In two stages, more than eighty per cent of 
the rural population was moved in the 1970s. There was considerable resistance 
to this policy, but it did deliver results. According to the UN, educational and 
medical facilities in rural Tanzania were among the best in Africa. Collective 
farms were also established, but only as a complement to small private farms. 
Whatever the case, the adopted model did not generate economic growth. 
The main reason why Vietnam and Tanzania were selected for a comparative 
study is that the problems they faced, and that ultimately led to radical reform, 
were so similar. At the end of the 1970s, Tanzania was hit by a currency crisis 
4. Easing back the state – Tanzania and Vietnam
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that climaxed in the early 1990s. The country responded by turning to the 
IMF but it was not willing to comply with the conditions attached to loans, in 
particular the freeing of the exchange rate. As a result, donor countries lost 
confidence in Tanzania. It took until 1995 before agreement was reached about 
economic reform by the donors and the Tanzanian government.
Vietnam ran into currency problems as a result of international developments. 
Since the Vietnam War, the country had been cut off from Western aid – 
Sweden being an exception – and it had no access to international financial 
institutions. The Vietnamese incursion into the neighbouring country of 
Cambodia in 1978 not only signalled a low point in relationships with the 
West but also a worsening of relationships with the People’s Republic of China. 
Vietnam was completely dependent on the Soviet Union and the Soviet-led 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). That was its main source 
of aid and investment (particularly in tropical crops, which the Comecon 
countries did not have). But Vietnam was swimming against the tide. At the end 
of the 1980s, the Comecon member themselves became enmired in economic 
difficulties. And the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990. 
The currency problems facing both Tanzania and Vietnam were the result of 
poor performance in agriculture, the principal sector in both their economies. 
Tanzanian export revenues came almost exclusively from crops such as sisal, tea, 
coffee, cashew nuts, pulses and sesame seeds. After 1970, agriculture started 
to suffer from the consequences of the heavy hand of state intervention: 
production fell. In Vietnam, the crisis was mainly the result of stagnation in 
the production of rice, the staple food crop. In 1985-1986, famine hit and the 
country had to turn to the international community for food aid. 
Why did things go so wrong in agriculture? Most economists have pointed 
to the lack of incentives for farmers to produce more. In Tanzania, this was 
accompanied in a few cases by the plummeting of agriculture prices, particularly 
for sisal. But the most convincing cause of falling agricultural productivity in 
Tanzania was the widening gap between global market prices and the prices 
farmers received from the state companies who bought their crops. In effect, 
farmers were taxed by these state companies and they responded by producing 
less. The subsequent decline in exports was the main cause of the currency 
crisis. 
According to economists, the collapse of rice production in Vietnam was also 
a result of the lack of incentives for farmers. The exchange rate (the price ratio 
between purchased and sold goods) between agriculture and the rest of the 
economy became increasingly unfavourable and the share of the cooperatives in 
production became ever larger. As inflation rose, there was less and less reason 
for the farmers to work on cooperative land and to sell to state companies 
because the latter kept a lid on prices. And taxes on agriculture were high, 
with farming households receiving between 13 to 15 per cent only of the crop 
return. 
The Vietnamese government attempted to collectivise agriculture as a whole. 
There was opposition from the farmers, among other reasons because of the 
poor management of collective farms, resulting in regular production crises. 
From time to time, these resulted in reforms involving concessions to private 
initiative which were often reversed later. In the past, it had been possible to 
offset production crises of this kind with food imports from Comecon countries, 
but this avenue was shut off as the end of the 1980s approached. 
Both Tanzania and Vietnam expected farmers to respond to liberalisation 
methods by raising food production because of the immediate profit incentive. 
In Vietnam, the shift was massive and dramatic but, in Tanzania, agricultural 
production recovered hesitantly and patchily. Food production in Vietnam was 
a lot lower in 1990 than in Tanzania, but it had caught up by 2001. After 2001, 
food production in Tanzania not only lagged behind Vietnam, it also fluctuated, 
whereas Vietnam achieved a consistent, gradual rise in production. 
How did the two economies develop after the reforms in the late 1980s? Let us 
look at their performance in greater detail.
      
* * *
IN 1985 TANZANIA CONCLUDED an agreement with the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), including the World Bank. That had an immediate 
positive impact on the flow of aid and so Tanzania had more to spend. However, 
this flow of aid did not lead to macro-economic stability. In the years 1985-
1998, inflation persisted at more than 10 per cent, with a peak in 1990 at 35.8 
per cent. Tanzania failed to rein in spending by ministries and state-owned 
enterprises. Their deficits were covered by the National Commercial Bank, 
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a state company, and financed monetarily (by printing money). Tanzania was 
pressured by donors to cut back on government expenditure and to tackle the 
corruption that had crept in over the years. Even in the absence of new aid on 
the horizon, the spending of aid in the pipeline continued. 
In the 1990s, Tanzania took leave of the one-party state, with multi-party 
elections being held for the first time in 1995. That year, the country agreed 
with the donor community to face up to the main causes of macro-economic 
instability. Ministry expenditure was curbed and the banking sector was 
reorganised. The Bank of Tanzania, the central bank, ceased acting as the 
government’s banker and was given more autonomy in terms of regulating the 
exchange rate and bank supervision. 
As inflation fell, economic growth recovered: during the years 1991-1999, it 
was still 2.8 per cent but it had already risen to 6.7 per cent in 2000-2008. 
Furthermore, the foreign currency problems were resolved. The Bank of 
Tanzania, in the years 1999-2006, had on average enough funds to finance 
imports for seven months. The international standard is three months. 
Since the start of the new millennium, Tanzania’s trade balance has been 
transformed. The value of exports tripled between 2000 and 2007: from USD 
335.8 to 942.1 million. Income from new export products, including Nile perch 
from Lake Victoria, cut flowers, vegetables and gold, outstripped traditional 
exports such as coffee and tea, traditionally Tanzania’s most important source 
of foreign currency. In 2007, non-agricultural goods made up 81.4 per cent of 
total exports. Of these, mining products – mainly gold – accounted for 44.5 per 
cent. The current account of the balance of payments was boosted by the rapid 
expansion of the tourist industry after 2000. 
The economic recovery of Tanzania would not have been possible without 
major donor involvement. In the years 2000-2006, the government received 
approximately USD 10 billion in balance-of-payments support, which more than 
made up for the deficits in the negative goods and services balance. At the same 
time, more than half of Tanzania’s debts were written off so that debt servicing 
in 2006 amounted to only 1.2 per cent of export income. The improvement 
in the balance of payments was therefore not so much a question of better 
economic performance but of donor support. 
This dependence on donors is also seen in the foreign share in soft loans and 
contributions to government spending – 40 per cent in the budget for 2004-
2005 – and in the proportion of development spending accounted for by aid: 
50 per cent in 2006. If this flow of aid were to dry up, Tanzania would be in 
serious financial difficulties. 
     
* * *
VIETNAM STARTED IN 1986 with what became known as Doi Moi 
(Innovation). The stated aim of the reforms was the formation of a ‘socialist-
oriented market economy’. Private manufacturing was permitted, and later 
actually encouraged, by the Communist Party of Vietnam. In addition, that party 
put a stop to the collectivisation of agriculture and encouraged independent 
farming activities. The official short-term goal of Doi Moi was ‘stabilisation 
of the economy, which is suffering under high inflation and severe economic 
imbalances’. That is a genuine difference between Tanzania and Vietnam. Whereas 
Vietnam tackled inflation straightaway, it took years before Tanzania made 
serious work of financial reform. In 1995, the prices in Tanzania rose by 27.4 per 
cent and economic growth was 3.6 per cent. In Vietnam, inflation that year was 
12.7 per cent and growth reached 9.5 per cent. 
When Vietnam started to reform, it could not, unlike Tanzania, count on donor 
support. In the late 1980s, Vietnam was still an international pariah. The state 
companies were mandated to go looking for foreign investors but Europe and 
the United States were not open to them. To break out of this international 
isolation, they established contacts with countries in Southeast and Eastern 
Asia. Even now, most foreign investment in Vietnam comes from South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Japan. The importance of those investments emerges 
from the level of direct foreign investment in GDP, which increased from 4 
per cent in 1990 to 50.6 per cent in 2003. In most cases, investments took 
the shape of joint ventures involving foreign enterprises and Vietnamese state-
owned companies. 
This inflow of foreign capital restored the balance of payments and Vietnam 
continued to be dependent on foreign investors, and even more so because, 
like Tanzania, it had a stubborn current account deficit. Nevertheless, Vietnam 
not only turned around its currency crisis using foreign capital, exports also 
expanded impressively. Export value rose by more than 550 per cent between 
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1987 and 2006. On the other hand, imports rose by 300 per cent and the cost 
of imports exceeded export revenue. Even so, Vietnam’s structural deficit on 
the current account has not pushed it into debt as deeply as Tanzania. Vietnam’s 
total foreign debt in 2006 was 32.2 per cent of GDP, as compared to Tanzania’s 
72 per cent. Aid for Vietnam has increased in recent years but it started at 
zero and it continues to be relatively modest. In Tanzania, development aid in 
2006 was 14.4 per cent of GDP, compared with 3.1 per cent in Vietnam. The 
Vietnamese economy’s weakness is not its dependence on donors but on 
foreign investment capital. 
* * *
IT IS STRIKING THAT THE positive direction taken by the Tanzanian balance of 
payments after 1995 has hardly made any contribution to poverty alleviation. 
This was mainly a feature in Dar es Salaam, the economic metropolis, and other 
urban areas, but not in rural parts of the country. The percentage of Tanzanians 
living below the poverty line did fall slightly countrywide: from 38.6 in 1991-
1992 to 35.6 in 2000-2001. The poverty index fell in ten years from 35 to 32.2 
per cent in urban areas, and from 40.8 to 38.6 per cent in rural areas.
Economic growth in Tanzania is confined to a small section of the real economy. 
Mining is the main growth sector, and it makes the biggest contribution to 
exports (24 per cent in 2000). Even so, its share of GDP is only 3 per cent and 
it accounts for only 1.75 per cent of salaried employment. Mining companies 
enjoy generous fiscal facilities, they are capital-intensive and they have trained 
staff who often come from outside Tanzania. The second largest growth sector 
is the tourist industry. It would appear to contribute more to Tanzanian income. 
In 1995, it employed 96,000 people; by 2004, this number was 160,750. 
Approximately 10 per cent of Tanzanians in paid employment work in this 
sector. Even so, a lot of income from tourism goes abroad, in part because of 
the luxury consumption pattern of tourists, and in part because foreigners have 
a large finger in this particular pie.
Poverty is in retreat faster in the towns than in the countryside, with urban 
drift as a result. In 1985, only 15 per cent of Tanzanians lived in cities; this figure 
had already reached 25 per cent by 2007. But there is still a lot of poverty 
in the cities. The percentage of poor people in the years 1990-2005 rose 
from 22 to 26 in Dar es Salaam and from 6 to 10 in other cities. Most of the 
urban population find precarious employment in the informal sector: from 
microtrading, with things like bottles of water and individual cigarettes, to small 
services like cleaning car windscreens. Average income in this sector is less than 
half of what people earn in salaried employment. It has been estimated that the 
informal sector accounts for 60 per cent of the urban economy. 
In the meantime, in rural areas, income from agriculture is continuing to fall. 
According to a study from 2003 looking at a random sample of Tanzanian 
villages, only half of domestic income came from crops and cattle, with the other 
half coming from wage work, self-employed crafts and money transfers. The 
expectation was that the liberalisation of the economy would result in a rise in 
agricultural production because a larger proportion of the global market price 
would go to the farmers. This did not happen. Most Tanzanians living in rural 
areas who are largely dependent on agriculture have failed to benefit from the 
improvements in the macro-economic situation. The situation was very different 
in Vietnam. 
* * *
IN VIETNAM, POVERTY was reduced dramatically after reforms started. The 
process was faster in the cities than in the countryside but poverty there also 
fell sharply. During the years 1993-2002, the national poverty index halved: from 
58.2 to 28.9 per cent. In cities, it fell from 25.1 to 6.6 per cent; and from 66.4 to 
35.6 per cent in rural areas. These are impressive figures.
Vietnam is, like Tanzania, still a predominantly agricultural country; less than a 
quarter of the population live in cities. In Tanzania, the share of agriculture in 
GDP has remained constant in recent decades at 45 per cent. The structure 
of the Vietnamese economy, by contrast, has undergone far-reaching changes 
since 1990. At the time, agriculture was good for 32 per cent of GDP, industry 
for 25 per cent and the service sector for 43 per cent. In 2006, the share of 
services was still about the same (40 per cent), but agriculture had declined to 
20 per cent and industry had risen to 40 per cent. This suggests a link between 
industrialisation and reducing poverty. 
Industrial growth is directly linked to the export successes of Vietnamese 
industrial products. Exports rose from 34 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 77 per 
cent in 2007. In the years 1997-2007, just under a quarter of exports (22.4 per 
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cent) came from oil, 21.9 per cent from food and 47.6 per cent, approximately 
half in other words, from industrial products. The last of these categories 
consisted primarily of textiles and clothes. Both foreign and Vietnamese 
companies are involved in exports, even though foreign involvement is on the 
increase: from 27 per cent of all exports in 1995 to 57 per cent in 2007.
The development of an industrial export sector using foreign capital has 
certainly contributed to the reduction of poverty but that role is a limited one. 
It is possible that industrialisation has also led to the formation of economic 
enclaves in Vietnam, with weak linkage to the rest of society. The clothing 
industry in particular is highly dependent on imports. Industries with foreign 
involvement are concentrated around the large cities and they employed skilled 
staff only. 
The conclusion must therefore be that it is not the growth of manufacturing 
industry and foreign investments that have made the largest contribution to 
the enormous reduction of poverty in Vietnam, but agriculture. By contrast 
with Tanzania, smallholders, and particularly rice farmers, achieved massive 
increases in production after the reforms. The explanation for the differences in 
development success between Tanzania and Vietnam can be found in agriculture. 
Before Doi Moi, Vietnam could just manage to feed itself in normal years. In 
the early 1990s, it moved up the field, becoming the world’s third largest rice 
exporter, and sometimes occupying second place on the global market. The 
country’s main food crop is therefore in abundant supply and this contributed 
to the reduction of poverty because rice is the staple food of the poor. This 
applies both to cities and countryside because there are also many households 
in rural areas that are not food self-sufficient and that buy rice. The production 
of cash crops such as coffee and cashew nuts has also expanded enormously.
 
* * * 
AGRICULTURE COULD PLAY the same role in Tanzania, because most people 
live in rural areas and this is where poverty is concentrated and where agriculture 
is the main economic activity. Why did agriculture in Tanzania perform so badly 
after the reforms compared with Vietnam, where this sector was responsible for 
the lion’s share of poverty alleviation? In Tanzania, growth in agriculture lags a long 
way behind other sectors. Why is it that the improvement in the macro-economy 
and economic growth failed to result in agricultural growth?
The first important difference with Vietnam is the food supply. In Tanzania, this is 
still problematic. Since the reforms started, more food has been imported. The 
total amount of available food is generally adequate to feed all the country’s 
mouths but distribution throughout the country is very uneven. Every year, 
dozens of districts report food shortages and even more do so when there 
are long periods of drought. Malnutrition in children under the age of five is 
common. In 2005, growth in almost four out of five children was retarded as 
a result of chronic undernourishment. The problem is linked to poverty and is 
probably more severe in rural than in urban areas. 
The contrast with Vietnam could not be greater. As pointed out above, that 
country was just about able to feed itself before the reforms and it is now a 
major rice exporter. By contrast with Tanzania, food production was assigned a 
larger role in the economic recovery of Vietnam than was food security alone. 
As the Vietnamese author Nguyen Do Anh Tuan found in 2006: ‘In fact one 
main reason [before the reforms] for high inflation and limited contribution 
of State Owned enterprises to the state in the pre-reform period was due 
to agricultural stagnation, food shortage, high relative prices of agricultural 
goods, and hence low profitability of SOEs. In contrast, food availability in the 
post-reform helped reduce inflation and set the sound base for growth of non 
agricultural output and employment.’ Increasing agricultural production not only 
boosted farmers’ income but also kept consumer prices low, as in the 1970s in 
Indonesia (see Chapter 2). 
Whereas the production in Vietnam of cash crops such as coffee and cashew 
nuts rose rapidly, the picture in Tanzania was one of stagnation. That country 
once had relatively prosperous farming communities growing cash crops such 
as coffee, cotton, cashew nuts and tea. When Tanzania started to reform its 
economy, the expectation was that this would lead to better prices for farmers 
and higher production. In normal competitive conditions, small producers 
would, it was thought, receive a higher share of the global market price and this 
would encourage them to increase their production of cash crops. A response 
of this kind was mainly expected when the government bodies for trading 
in agricultural products were dismantled. But supply was disappointing. It did 
recover slightly, but it then stuck at a low level. 
Part of the explanation is that the farmers’ share of the export price hardly rose 
at all. It was low in the years 1994-1999: 21.8 per cent for pyrethrum (a natural 
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insecticide obtained from chrysanthemums) and 34.5 per cent for tea. The 
farmers’ share was high for cashew nuts (64.7 per cent) and dried tobacco (74.9 
per cent). However, in most cases, they received 50 per cent of the export price 
in the years 1994-1999. By comparison, 1980 was a low point: 41.7 per cent for 
all export crops.
The fact that export crops proved not to be the source of income for Tanzanian 
farmers that they might have been has been attributed by researchers to the 
local market, which was certainly not free. Liberalisation, they noted, failed to 
put an end to the exploitation of farmers by local bureaucrats. In 2010, only 
cashew-nut buying was restricted to private traders. Cooperatives muscled 
in as buyers for other crops alongside private traders. In some cases, farmers 
received advances from those cooperatives but sold their crops to traders 
later. In response, the government tightened up the reins again. While market 
authorities were in a position to regulate the market alone after the reforms, 
new legislation was put into place that allowed them to buy crops themselves. 
At the same time, local leaders, who were under pressure to raise their income, 
started to tax export crops – which was the easiest solution to their problems. 
In recent years, there was considerable legal uncertainty in Tanzania and a 
random approach to trading in cash crops, and that has not encouraged farmers 
to make increases in production.
* * * 
THERE ARE NO SIMPLE explanations for the gap in economic performance 
between Tanzania and Vietnam. The literature on the Vietnamese reforms is now 
extensive, and it places a strong – and one-sided – emphasis on one specific 
factor : market forces. The idea is that they reduced poverty. Where poverty has 
proved persistent, the claim is that this is due to shortcomings in the market. 
If the poverty statistics are broken down by region, we see that remote areas 
have not performed as well as areas close to centres of business activity. In the 
north, the latter overlap with the Red River Delta, with its intensive, irrigated 
rice farming. In the Southeast, where most districts are relatively prosperous, the 
idea is that this is a reflection of the proximity of Ho Chi Minh city (the former 
Saigon). And most districts in the Mekong Delta are thought to be doing well, 
with the exception of a few coastal districts and districts near the Cambodian 
border. 
Seen in these terms, the Vietnamese economy would make more progress if 
it were to dispense with the remnants of socialist inefficiency. These ‘remnants’ 
are considered to be the continuing domination of state-owned enterprises; a 
banking sector in the hands of the government, shoring up those state-owned 
enterprises; and market regulation for rice using export quotas. All these things 
are seen as obstacles to the further development of an entrepreneur class 
driven by profit and loss accounts, rather than administrative influence. 
Jan Kees van Donge has a different view. He believes that the workings of the 
Vietnamese rice market actually show that a spectacular growth of production 
can only be explained if one takes state intervention in that market into account. 
It is no coincidence that the rapid increase in rice production started in the 
Mekong Delta. There, it was possible to profit from earlier government investment 
in infrastructure, such as irrigation and drainage, soil improvement and the 
development of rice varieties that made several annual harvests possible. In the 
central planning days, the state had made large-scale investments in agriculture but 
this did not result automatically in increases in production. To make the most of 
these investments, it was necessary to provide stronger incentives for the farmers 
and that was only possible by running down collectivised production. Observers 
often miss the important role played by agricultural credits and inputs from the 
state (such as seeds, fertilisers and pesticides). 
Most commentators see state-owned companies as parasites. They believe 
that the way to eliminate the final obstacles to entrepreneurial initiative is to 
liberalise Vietnam further. A frequently-quoted report from the International 
Food Policy Research Institution (IFPRI) from 1996 argues that state 
intervention in the Vietnamese rice trade results in the wrongful appropriation 
of agricultural surpluses by state-owned companies. The state monopoly on the 
rice trade between the Mekong Delta and areas with rice shortages, it is argued, 
generates major profits. This is thought to be even truer of state involvement in 
rice exports. The suggestion is that the difference between the lower domestic 
price for rice and the export price rice amounts to an export levy of 30 per 
cent. The general drift of these comments is that liberalisation leads to higher 
productivity. The freer the market, the higher the gain in productivity. 
Van Donge has pointed out that these arguments virtually disregard the way 





article from Luu Thanh Duc Hai, a lecturer in economy at the Cantho University 
in Vietnam, who gives a detailed description of the rice trade in the Mekong 
Delta and sketches a picture of a flourishing private sector of private buyers, 
wholesalers and millers, a very competitive environment. Nevertheless, ‘a major 
market share is still in the hands of the State Owned Enterprises and State 
farms. The Vietnamese market is not that private as many policy makers want us 
to believe.’
Two state companies, Vinafood I and Vinafood II, dominate rice exports, but not 
only that. According to Duc Hai, ‘more than 56 per cent of white rice from State 
owned enterprises is exported and around 14 percent is sold to the domestic 
market. About 80 percent of the supply sold on the domestic market is 
transferred to deficit regions in the North as part of the National Food Security 
Program.’ Private traders can obtain export licences but they are minor players 
(accounting for 6.5 per cent of rice exports in 2001). In 2008, the government 
imposed a general ban on exports. The state-owned enterprises are of course 
also buyers and the government wants them to buy, especially when prices 
drop, in order to maintain a floor price. 
Duc Hai believes this is how the price for rice is formed: ‘The domestic price 
strongly depends on international prices. The government derives a minimum 
export price from international rice prices. SOEs and other large millers/
owners derive their price level from this minimum level. Moreover, State Owned 
Enterprises are encouraged to guarantee a floor price to domestic producers. 
At the local level the bargain process is driven by competition.’ 
The Vietnamese policymakers had, in the early days of the Doi Moi, a ‘socialist-
oriented market economy’ in mind. What seemed to be an ideological alibi in 
1986 for what were, in effect, capitalist reforms have now taken shape in what 
Van Donge describes as a managed market. Price considerations play a role 
in that market, but a limited one. Van Donge suggests that it was not so much 
liberalisation that was the driving force behind the growth of the Vietnamese 
economy since 1990, but a unique combination of state intervention and 
market forces. The state-led economy has not been pushed out, he says, but 
adapted creatively. 
The Vietnamese economy has probably never been the centrally led, monolithic, 
entity propagated by the Marxist-Leninist catechisms. There are indications that 
the leadership engaged in reform as a result of domestic pressure. Provincial 
governments probably had more autonomy than was considered possible in a 
framework of central control. The fact that Vietnam suffered from hyperinflation 
in the 1980s suggests that price formation was not a monopoly of central 
planners and that independent economic players were also active. 
The reforms did not explode the state sector; they introduced gradual change. 
The involvement of the state in the economy was gradually run down. In 1995, 
67 per cent of the industrial companies were state-owned; by 2007, that figure 
fell to a – still substantial – 57 per cent. Nevertheless, this sizeable state sector 
did not prevent rapid growth. Although there are still stories to be told about 
shocking cases of inefficiency, there are also many examples of successful joint 
ventures and productive contributions from the public sector. 
Maintaining a – relatively inefficient – state sector and subsidy mechanisms on 
the food markets is expensive. Fortuitously, liberalisation in Vietnam coincided 
with the start of oil prospecting. Oil revenue helps the government to obtain 
the required currency and to stop gaps in the budget. Van Donge: ‘The state had 
the resources to control the market.’ 
* * *
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY by Tracking Development exposed major 
differences in the economic performance of Tanzania and Vietnam after the 
introduction of reforms. The researchers also listed four factors that provide a 
provisional explanation for those differences. 
First of all, Vietnam made macro-economic stabilisation a priority and tackled 
its enormous inflation. This was an essential component of the liberalisation 
programme. The Tanzanian economy started to grow only after 1995 when the 
country got a grip on inflation. 
Other researchers have frequently missed the second important factor : the role 
of government. Vietnam reformed its state institutions but left them in place, 
while liberalisation in Tanzania after 1995 was located in an institutional vacuum. 
Vietnam imposed budgetary limitations on the state institutions in order to 
safeguard their continued existence. Tanzania failed to impose discipline on the 
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public sector, with all the inevitable waste as a result. As soon as discipline was 
imposed on Tanzanian state-owned companies, they collapsed.
The third factor is the Vietnamese food policy. Well-planned state intervention 
keeps the prices within a bandwidth that guarantees farmers a minimum 
income and caps price rises for consumers. The regulation of food exports plays 
a key role here. The people of Vietnam are well fed by comparison with their 
Tanzanian counterparts. Ample supplies of affordable food were an important 
way of reducing poverty and, at the same time, an instrument for suppressing 
inflation. Food supply and consumption are erratic and unpredictable in Tanzania.
The fourth factor is probably the oil revenue available to the Vietnamese 
government, contrasting with access to mineral resources in Tanzania, which is 
much more limited. Oil income compensated for a shortage of currency and 
budget deficits in Vietnam. But the main benefit was that the income from oil 
allowed Vietnam to subsidise rural areas and that is probably the key factor in 
Vietnam’s successful development. 
Incidentally, as we now know, mineral resources are no guarantee of economic 
success. That depends to a large extent on the policy determining whether 





CAMBODIA AND UGANDA, the fourth pair of countries studied by Tracking 
Development to compare economic performance, are latecomers in terms 
of economic development. Both countries were afflicted by civil wars in the 
1970s and 1980s. In Uganda, growth only resumed when Yoweri Museveni came 
to power in 1986. In Cambodia, reconstruction and economic development 
made their way onto the agenda only after the provisional reconciliation 
between Hun Sen’s socialist party and the Royalists in 1993. These relatively 
short periods of time make it more difficult to arrive at far-reaching conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the policies in place than in the case of the other 
country pairings. Tracking Development researchers André Leliveld and Han 
ten Brummelhuis looked at the question of whether the differences between 
countries in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa noted elsewhere also 
applied to Cambodia and Uganda. 
Both countries were, after hostilities ended, still poor agricultural economies 
and their governments repeatedly pointed to the importance of agriculture in 
combating poverty. The researchers therefore concentrated primarily on the 
agricultural policies and the results of those policies, focusing on the ‘post-war’ 
period: 1990-2010. At the time, both countries had crippled economies and 
lacked resources. These factors were one reason they opted for market-driven 
development in the agricultural sector and in the economy as a whole, with 
government playing a modest role. Agricultural production in the two countries 
developed along similar lines for a long time after 1960, but started to diverge 
in 2005, when growth in Cambodia accelerated and agricultural production 
in Uganda stagnated. The researchers hoped to find an explanation for this 
development gap.
* * *
UGANDA, A COUNTRY in East Africa with a multi-ethnic population 
estimated at 35 million souls (2012), was a British protectorate from the end 
of the 19th century until independence in 1962. The territory of Uganda 
comprises five traditional kingdoms: Toro, Buganda, Bunyoro-Kitara, Busoga and 
Angkole. The early years after independence were overshadowed by a power 
struggle between Prime Minister Milton Obote, a Lango from the north, and 
the President, the King of Buganda Edward Muteesa II. The parliament, which 
was dominated by Obote’s party, then amended the constitution. In 1967, 
the traditional kingdoms were ‘abolished’ and, without new elections being 
held, Obote became president with far-reaching executive powers. He was 
deposed in 1971 by Major General Idi Amin, who had built up a career in the 
King’s African Rifles, the colonial army. That signalled the start of a dictatorship 
that was to last eight years. In 1972, Amin forcibly expelled the Asian business 
community, which played a key role in trade and industry. The result was the 
total meltdown of the Ugandan economy.
Amin’s regime fell in 1979 during the war between Uganda and the 
neighbouring country of Tanzania. After provocations from Amin’s army, which 
wanted to appropriate a part of Tanzania, the Tanzanian forces, working together 
with Ugandan exiles, invaded Uganda and deposed Amin. However, this did 
not signal the end of domestic unrest. Obote was appointed president again 
and exacted bloody revenge on his political opponents. After five years of bush 
war (1981-1986), a civil war involving several militias organised on ethnic lines, 
the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni gained the 
upper hand. In 1986, he was declared president. 
Museveni wanted to put an end to the persistent ethnic disputes and he 
therefore trimmed the wings of the political parties, which were mainly 
groupings on tribal lines. They were not banned, but local organisations were 
shut down and they were not allowed to choose their own candidates; party 
members were allowed to participate in elections in a personal capacity only. 
In 1993, the old kingdoms were restored, with the exception of Angkole. In the 
1990s, Museveni was seen in the West as an exponent of a new, democratically-
minded generation of African leaders who were concerned about the plight 
of the poor. As a result, he could count on generous financial support; by that 
time, 48 per cent of the Ugandan budget was financed by funds from abroad. 
Museveni was able to restore domestic calm, with the exception of the north, 
where the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was active. In response to pressure 
from donor countries and after a domestic referendum, the restrictions on 
political parties were lifted in 2005. 
* * *
CAMBODIA, AFTER SIX CENTURIES as the independent Khmer kingdom, 
had been the vassal of neighbouring countries from the 15th century until the 
mid-19th century, when it was colonised by the French. In 1954, the French 
protectorate achieved independence as the kingdom of Cambodia under King 
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– later Prince and Prime Minister – Norodom Sihanouk. During the Cold War, 
the country preserved its neutrality until, despite its best efforts, it became 
involved in the late 1960s in the war in Vietnam. When Sihanouk turned a blind 
eye to the presence of the North Vietnamese army in Cambodian territory, the 
pro-American Prime Minister, General Lon Nol, organised a coup in 1970. He 
deposed Sihanouk and declared the Khmer Republic, which was immediately 
recognised by the United States. The Prince fled to Beijing, where he formed a 
royal government-in-exile and supported the communist Khmer Rouge, which 
was engaged in a guerrilla war against the regime of Lon Nol. As a result, the 
ranks of the Khmer Rouge were strengthened by thousands of non-political 
farmers who had only a vague idea of what communism was, but who wanted 
to support their sovereign.
After the American withdrawal from Vietnam (in 1973), the Khmer Rouge 
entered the capital Phnom Penh two weeks before the fall of Saigon in April 
1975. The regime of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot modelled the country on 
the lines of Mao Tse-tung’s China during the Great Leap Forward. As soon as it 
took power, it evacuated the towns and sent the entire population on forced 
marches to rural work projects. The Khmer Rouge razed temples, libraries 
and anything considered Western to the ground. About one and a half million 
Cambodians (out of a population of 7 million) were executed, or perished from 
exhaustion, hunger and disease. 
After the Khmer Rouge launched raids in Vietnamese territory, the Vietnamese 
army invaded Cambodia in November 1978. It expelled the Pol Pot regime and 
installed a puppet regime under the Khmer Rouge dissident Hun Sen, who had 
fled earlier to Vietnam. The regime was internationally isolated throughout the 
1980s and was completely dependent on Vietnam and its Eastern European 
allies. It was opposed by a government-in-exile consisting of the Khmer Rouge 
and monarchists, which exerted control over parts of Cambodia through 
armed units. This opposition government was recognised by the United States 
and supported by China, the USA and the United Kingdom, which imposed 
an economic boycott on the Phnom Penh regime. Peace talks began in 1989. 
The Vietnamese army withdrew from Cambodia after the fall of the Soviet 
Union and a UN peace force monitored the ceasefire between the opposing 
parties. In 1993, Hun Sen and Sihanouk buried their differences. The ageing 
Prince returned to the throne. When one of his sons, who was also the joint 
Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, established contacts in 1997 with 
remaining Khmer Rouge rebels, Hun Sen withdrew from the coalition with the 
royalist party (FUNCINPEC). He formed a government that relied entirely on 
support from his own Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Sihanouk, who was old 
and ailing, abdicated in 2004 in favour of his son Norodom Sihamoni. 
* * * 
IN THE MEANTIME, what was the situation of the economies of Cambodia 
and Uganda? They were, and still are, predominantly agricultural and small farms 
still hold sway. This is a common feature of the two countries, but there are also 
major differences. The soil and climate in Uganda favour agriculture. It depends 
on rainfall, which is generous in most of the country. As a result, double cropping 
is possible, particularly in the central and western districts, which are home 
to 55 per cent of the population and most agricultural production. Ugandan 
farmers generally grow several crops at the same time: bananas, cassava, millet, 
sorghum, sweet potatoes, beans and maize, in combination with one or two 
export crops such as coffee, cotton, cocoa and tobacco. In recent times, Uganda 
has seen a rise in livestock farming and dairy production.
Although Cambodia has more options in terms of irrigation, conditions are less 
propitious for agriculture than in Uganda. The soil is not very fertile. Agriculture 
in Cambodia consists almost exclusively of rice, and it is concentrated around 
the Tonle Sap lake and along the rivers, which is where 90 per cent of the 
population live. Rice, which is a thirsty crop, depends on rainfall in most places 
and so the harvest is just once a year. Double cropping is possible only in 
areas where irrigation is feasible, which was only 14 per cent of the area under 
cultivation for rice in 2010. Although rice is king, Cambodia also has chamcar: 
farming on rivers involving crops other than rice such as maize, sugar cane, 
tobacco, cotton, pumpkin, watermelon, soya beans, sesame and mung beans. 
In Cambodia and Uganda, agriculture is the domain of smallholders, who work 
with cheap inputs and labour-intensive techniques. During colonial times, the 
British decided not to set up any large-scale plantations in Uganda, with the 
exception of tea and sugar companies. Instead, they introduced cotton and 
coffee in a system of ‘forced farming’ for smallholders. In this way, the latter had 
regular contacts with colonial administrators. After independence in 1962, the 
state remained actively involved in agriculture in Uganda. Government services 
played an important role in the selection of crops, trade and price regulation 
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for export crops, the establishment of research and education services, and 
infrastructure for processing and trading. These last activities were dominated by 
the Indian minority in Uganda, a legacy of the colonial age. 
During the same period, the French were developing large-scale enterprises for 
rubber production and commercial rice cultivation in Cambodia. The French 
did not get involved with smallholders growing rice for their own use, and that 
policy continued after independence in 1954. In the 1960s, Cambodia became 
the world’s third-largest exporter of rice. Even so, agricultural development was 
never the target of systematic policy from either the colonial or post-colonial 
governments. That explains why Cambodian farmers hardly got involved at all in 
cash crops in the early years following independence. 
The violent conflicts in both countries led to a dramatic fall in agricultural 
production in the 1970s. The Khmer Rouge completely overturned the 
organisation of Cambodian rural society, forcing people into new social 
arrangements with a hard hand. This all led to a demographic meltdown from 
which the country has recovered gradually over the past three decades. In 
2012, Cambodia had a population of 15 million. The dislocation of the Ugandan 
rural economy started in 1972 with the violent expulsion of 92,000 Indians 
by the Amin regime. That led to the total collapse of processing and trade in 
agricultural products. In the years 1972-1979, the campaign of domestic terror 
and armed conflicts resulted in the deaths of half a million Ugandans out of 
what was then a population of 12 million. 
After Idi Amin and Pol Pot were pushed out (both in 1979) agricultural 
production increased in both countries, albeit by fits and starts. In the 1980s, 
the regime in Cambodia attempted to reorganise rural areas by following the 
example of Vietnam. But planned rice cultivation was a paper reality: in practice, 
farmers did as they liked. Even so, Cambodia managed to raise agricultural 
production during this ‘Vietnamese period’ (1979-1989). New rice varieties 
were introduced and, with help from Australia and the International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI), a research service was established to support rice 
farming.
In Uganda, the government resumed its active involvement in agriculture, mainly 
in the trade of export crops, but its hands were tied by the structural reform 
programme imposed on the country in 1981 by the IMF and the World Bank. 
The recovery in agricultural production did not last long because the ‘bush war’ 
broke out in 1983. Most farmers stopped with the production of export crops 
and switched to food crops such as cassava.
 
* * *
THE NEW GOVERNMENTS that came to power in about 1990 in Cambodia 
and Uganda had very little policy latitude after a long period of civil wars. 
Effectively, they were bankrupt and so they were dependent on foreign aid. 
The donor agenda at the time was dominated by the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
(IMF, World Bank and the American Ministry of Finance). That amounted to 
extending the role of the market and pushing back government involvement in 
the economy, and it afforded few openings for state intervention in production 
sectors. 
In Uganda, agriculture was largely privatised and deregulated in line with the 
IMF programme of structural reform. The government opted for a market-
driven development model. Agricultural production in the years 1987-2005 
far exceeded the level in the years 1960-1987. Until the mid-1990s, bananas, 
followed by dairy, maize and cassava, were dominant. The production of coffee, 
the export crop, remained erratic. Attempts to introduce more variety to the 
export package with the introduction of high-grade products such as vanilla, silk, 
flowers and red peppers achieved only partial success or ended in total failure. 
The rise in agricultural production was mainly the result of the extension of the 
area under cultivation, not in improvements in productivity, with the exception 
of the dairy sector and cassava cultivation. The increase in productivity was 
only between 13 and 49 per cent of what was achieved at testing stations, and 
productivity in the leading crops stagnated or fell after the early 1990s. Smallholders 
were still making only scarce use of purchased inputs. Only 1 per cent were using 
chemical fertilisers and 6.3 per cent said they were using improved seed. 
In 1989, the Vietnamese left Cambodia but that did not result in the stabilisation 
of the country. International isolation came to an end only in 1991 with the 
Paris Agreements, and domestic quiet returned only after the 1993 elections. 
Agricultural production in Cambodia started to rise from 1995 onwards. Like 
Uganda, the country opted for a market-driven development model for the 
agricultural sector and the economy as a whole. Most success was achieved 
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in rice production. Production volume and productivity increased dramatically 
between 1991 and 2010 as a result of a major extension of irrigation, the 
introduction of improved rice varieties with high yields and the intensification of 
cultivation with two harvests in the rainy season. Productivity in rice cultivation 
rose from 2.12 tons per hectare in 2000 to 2.97 tons per hectare in 2010. Even 
so, rice farmers in Cambodia lagged behind their counterparts in Vietnam and 
Indonesia in terms of productivity. 
The rise in agricultural production in Cambodia and Uganda was both a peace 
dividend and a response by the farmers to market liberalisation. From 2005 
onwards, levels of agricultural production in Cambodia and Uganda started 
to diverge. Growth in Cambodia accelerated, catching up with Uganda within 
a year. There, the increase in agricultural production came to a halt in 2004. 
This applied to all the major crops; only the livestock and dairy sectors have 
managed to grow slightly since. 
What are the reasons for these different development trajectories? Ten 
Brummelhuis and Leliveld took a closer look at agricultural policies and practices 
on the ground in the two countries. 
* * *
THE SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS led by Museveni’s NRM, and also the 
President himself, have been firm in their statements about the importance 
of agricultural development. From 1987 onwards, reforms in the agricultural 
sector were a recurrent component of economic policy. After hesitating initially, 
Museveni, a former Marxist, accepted the conditions of the World Bank and 
the IMF in 1987. He liberalised foreign trade, abolished import taxes and freed 
the exchange rate. Price formation for agricultural products, including export 
crops such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco, was left to the market. The goal 
of the agricultural policy was to improve the income and living standards of 
poor farmers by boosting productivity and leaving a larger share of production 
to the market. The market, not a policy targeting self-sufficiency, was to improve 
the food security of households. In about 1994, trade in agricultural products 
was entirely in the hands of local traders and private exporters. The number 
of outreach workers was reduced from 15,000 to 3,000. The traditionally 
important role played by government in agriculture was reduced to ‘facilitating 
private initiative’.
The year 2001 saw the launch of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture 
(PMA), with full support from the President and the technocrats of the Ministry 
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED). The underlying 
thinking was that the fight against poverty would be conducted using ‘a 
profitable, competitive, sustainable and dynamic agricultural and agro-industrial 
[processing] sector’. Agriculture was to be reformed by raising productivity 
using crop varieties with high yields that were also resistant to disease, using 
sound agricultural techniques and by maintaining soil fertility with animal and 
chemical fertilisers. The supply of seed, inputs and credits was left to the private 
sector. Agricultural outreach work, with visits to and training for farmers, was 
dismantled and replaced by decentralised National Agricultural Advisory 
Services (NAADS). The idea was that farmers would henceforth hire advisors 
from this organisation. 
Until 2005, this policy was supported by a coalition of the president, the 
technocrats of the MoFPED and a few important donors. That year saw the end 
of the political monopoly of Museveni’s NRM. After a national referendum, the 
restrictions on political parties were lifted. Multi-party elections were to be held 
for the first time since 1986. That meant that Museveni and the NRM had to 
compete for the votes of rural electors, and the President was not satisfied with 
the results of the PMA. The NRM’s manifesto included more state intervention 
in some areas: it called for the appointment of trained staff in every village as 
driving forces for local development. The NRM won the elections and the new 
programme was launched in 2008. The distance between Museveni and the 
technocrats grew, even though that coalition had been fruitful in the 1990s. 
* * *
THE RESEARCHERS ATTRIBUTE the stagnation of agriculture in Uganda 
after 2005 to two factors: a limited budget and inconsistencies in policy 
implementation. 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric from Museveni and his government, only a small 
proportion of public expenditure went to this sector. Although agriculture 
accounted for approximately half of GDP, the share of the budget devoted 
to this sector was 4.7 per cent in the years 1991-1992, falling to 3 per cent 
in 1994-1995 and then to less than 2 per cent in 1997. It then rose for some 
time but, even though Uganda signed the Maputo Declaration in 2003, in which 
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the member states of the African Union undertook to devote 10 per cent of 
their annual expenditure to agriculture, that percentage has steadily declined in 
Uganda: from 8 per cent of the budget in 2001-2002 to 5.7 per cent in 2005-
2006, 4.1 per cent in 2007-2008, 3.7 per cent in 2008-2009 and 3.1 per cent in 
the draft budget for 2009-2010.
The researchers list three reasons why government expenditure on agriculture 
is so low in Uganda. First of all, donors, who finance almost half of the Ugandan 
budget, prioritised education and health care for a long time. Secondly, relations 
between the Ministries of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
(MoFPED) and of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAAIF) are thought to be 
strained. The technocrats of MoFPED are convinced that the civil servants at 
MAAIF cannot muster the financial discipline required to use more resources 
responsibly. Furthermore, it is claimed that salaries account for an excessive 
share of the MAAIF budget so that not enough is left over for other areas. 
Finally, there was a consensus from the 1990s onwards – involving the president, 
the technocrats in his government and the donors – that agriculture should be 
left to private initiative.
The second explanation given by the researchers for stagnation in Ugandan 
agriculture is the way the policy impacts farmers, and the politicisation of 
implementation. Political loyalties have played an ever larger role in this area. 
The researchers take agricultural outreach work as an example. The National 
Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) is a semi-autonomous body with a 
mandate to provide, on an entirely demand-driven basis, farmers with services, 
to encourage them to farm a wider range of crops and produce more for the 
market. It has been partially successful. A World Bank evaluation dating from 
2007 stated that crops under cultivation had become more diverse and that 
more of the harvest was going to market. The gross income of farmers using 
the services of the NAADS increased by between 32 and 63 per cent. No 
information was provided about how many farmers qualified for this assistance 
and how they were selected. 
NAADS has been the target of criticism recently, both in the local press and in 
professional journals. It is claimed that the service is not well informed about 
Ugandan agricultural practice. Most farmers are not interested in courses in 
classrooms. It is claimed that many participants do not realise that they will 
later have to pay back 70 per cent of the purchased inputs. Farmers are said to 
feel that certain crops, such as cassava, are being forced on them for no good 
reason. Furthermore, NAADS does not target entire villages; it selects only six 
farmers in each settlement. Only rich NRM supporters are selected. Another 
criticism in the press is that only people with capital that can be cashed in, like a 
cow, benefit from the NAADS. Although the NAADS is active in all districts of 
the country, it therefore fails to reach the critical mass of farmers. 
Under the direct authority of Museveni, a non-transparent parallel structure 
was established in the NAADS that targets NRM farmers. He poses as a father 
figure who wants the best for the people, but hands out envelopes to his 
supporters when he stops off during tours of the provinces. Farmers are also 
approached by civil servants with promises of improvements to their farms if 
they sign a form stating that they have received 100 kg of seed, even though 
they only receive 30 kg. These corrupt practices and this bargaining of favours 
are an increasing obstacle to the consistent implementation of the agricultural 
policy. They explain in part why agriculture in Uganda stagnated after 2005, 
while Cambodia performed better and better in the same period.
* * *
IN CAMBODIA, IT TOOK longer for agricultural development to acquire an 
important position on the political agenda. During the early years after the 
departure of the Vietnamese (in 1989), farmers were allowed to sell their 
products freely at market prices. In 1994, Cambodia received a loan from the 
IMF in exchange for structural reforms. The ban on rice exports was lifted in 
December 1995 and rubber exports were liberalised. In the 1994 Development 
Plan, improvements to rural living conditions were an integral part of 
development policy for the first time. The thinking was that this would be largely 
left to market forces. 
Until 1998, the Cambodian elite earned hardly anything from the agricultural 
sector. The lax attitude of the Ministry of Agriculture was also linked to donor 
priorities, which focused more on education and health care than on state 
intervention in agriculture. The Ministry suffered constantly from a lack of funds. 
Furthermore, the department was run by a royalist politician in the years 1993-
1998, and the civil servants answerable to him were monitored by Hun Sen’s 
CPP, which was not happy for royalist ministers to get in the good books of the 
electorate with successful policy initiatives; that was the preserve of the CPP. The 
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royalist politicians complained that their civil servants provided them with no 
information whatsoever. 
In 1998, Hun Sen manoeuvred FUNCINPEC, Prince Ranariddh’s royalist party, 
out of the government. From that point onwards, he was the sole Prime 
Minister and he no longer needed to devote energy to the power struggle 
with the royalists. As a result, the conditions were more favourable for public 
investment in agriculture, particularly in boosting rice production. The increased 
government interest was linked more to the prospect of profitable international 
transactions involving locally produced rice than to concern for the plight of 
poor farmers. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the government 
needed extra income and agriculture could provide it. The increase in the 
budget for the Ministry of Agriculture coincided with a shift in donor priorities. 
From 2000 onwards, international aid organisations turned to combating 
poverty, and agriculture was a priority in that area. Cambodia’s Second 
Development Plan for the years 2001-2005 stated that the country’s agricultural 
potential was a tool for economic growth and the fight against poverty. 
In 2002 and 2003, Cambodia faced local and national elections. The CPP had 
to do something for the large numbers of rural electors. The fact that the party 
gained an overwhelming majority in both elections shows that this approach 
worked. 
In the 2000-2003 and 2003-2004 seasons, when rice harvests were threatened 
by drought, leading CPP officials regularly visited rural constituencies bringing 
‘gifts’, such as water pumps and diesel, making it possible to save the harvest. 
They came not only from the Ministry of Agriculture but also from Foreign 
Affairs and other ministries. In the run-up to the national elections of 2003, 
CPP politicians demonstrated an entirely new interest in rural development 
by building roads and irrigation facilities. Prime Minister Hun Sen himself set 
an example. Once again a candidate for prime minister, he focused all his 
attentions on a development zone to the west of Phnom Penh and on his own 
constituency. That inspired other members of the party to make similar efforts 
for their rural electors.
The revival of interest in agriculture was also due to the commitment of the 
new Minister of Agriculture, Chan Sarun. He had already spent time as a civil 
servant at the ministry in the 1980s, and subsequently as the Chancellor of the 
Royal University of Agriculture. He had the technical expertise required to set 
out a more effective agricultural policy geared towards ‘the reform of the entire 
sector in accordance with market principles’. He organised regular meetings 
with the heads of provincial departments of agriculture, for example about their 
experience with the Systematic Rice Improvement (SRI) programme. The idea 
behind this programme was to convince rice farmers to use seeds and water 
more efficiently and, at the same time, to teach them techniques for enhancing 
crop sizes per cultivated area. The result was an improvement in yields. The 
minister himself checked to make sure that civil servants enjoyed the farmers’ 
confidence and that they trained them in the new techniques. 
It should be pointed out that government expenditure on agriculture in 
Cambodia is as unimpressive as in Uganda. In the past 15 years, it has lagged 
a long way behind spending on education and health care. It did more than 
double in the years 2004-2007: 1.7 per cent of the budget for 2010 was 
devoted to agriculture. Adding the 0.7 per cent for water management and 1.7 
per cent for rural development results in a meagre 4.1 per cent. The reasons for 
this modest percentage are approximately the same as in Uganda. Donors long 
believed that agriculture had to be left to private initiative and, for a long time, 
the elite had hardly any agricultural interests. This situation has changed in recent 
years. Politicians had to bid for votes and they drew on private funds from 
outside the budget to do so. The researchers suspect that considerable sums 
were invested in informal ways, which is something that is difficult to quantify. 
This is a difference with Uganda, where politicians, led by the president, curried 
favour with the electorate from public funds.
Agricultural outreach work in Cambodia has, since 1997, been in the hands 
of the Centre for Study and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC) which, 
since 2002, has been the largest non-governmental organisation in Cambodia 
providing training and education for farmers. The Systematic Rice Improvement 
(SRI) programme, which was launched in 2000, brings together the government 
and CEDAC. The activities of CEDAC cover villages as a whole, not just selected 
farmers in each village as in the case of the NAADS. CEDAC also has closer ties 
with the farmers than NAADS, where the largest part of the budget is spent on 
salaries.
CEDAC is effective. A recent evaluation of the SRI programme found that 
‘programme farmers’ had produced 1.16 tons of rice per hectare more than 
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farmers who stuck to conventional farming methods, raising the average yield 
to 3.5 tons per hectare. Farmers who followed the programme managed 
to achieve a cutback of 50 per cent in chemical fertilisers compared with 
conventional farmers and saved 55 kg of seed per hectare compared with non-
participants. 
There are other reasons for the relative success of educational activities in 
Cambodia compared with Uganda. The NAADS has to spread its work across 
a range of different crops. This fragmentation of experience, knowledge and 
research is not needed in a rice-based society such as Cambodia, where 
‘eating rice’ is equivalent to survival, and where farmers cultivating cassava, 
maize or potatoes are viewed with contempt. The fact that rice dominates 
both consumption and exports is an advantage in that technical and economic 
efforts can concentrate on a single crop. In addition, rice can be stored for a 
longer period of time. Furthermore, rice farming in Cambodia has been able 
to benefit from knowledge and experience in the region, particularly from 
the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). In Uganda, raising agricultural 
productivity is much more challenging because introducing improved varieties is 
complicated by the variety of crops involved. 
 
* * *
IN THE COUNTRIES OF Southeast Asia that led the way in terms of 
government investment in agriculture, those investments were a significant 
factor, as we have seen, in reducing poverty. The question now is whether the 
market-driven agricultural policies of Cambodia and Uganda have benefited the 
rural poor. World Bank figures from 2011 show that Uganda has performed 
better in this respect than Cambodia, while agricultural production in the latter 
country has risen faster since 2005. In Uganda, the percentage of poor people 
between 1992 and 2009 fell from 60 to 27; in Cambodia, this figure fell from 
40 per cent in 1997 to 35 per cent in 2009. How can this apparent paradox be 
explained? 
First of all, in both countries, only a small proportion of total development 
expenditure goes to agriculture and the effects of agricultural policy on the 
income and prosperity of farmers should not be overestimated. The impact 
of other forms of rural development are, so far, more evident in Uganda 
than in Cambodia because they have a longer history there. Uganda received 
international aid for education, health care and infrastructure back in the early 
1990s, while large-scale development aid for Cambodia became available after 
2000 only. In Cambodia, the reduction of poverty is primarily a result of the 
resumption of economic activity after the restoration of peace, and not so much 
the consequence of a specific strategy. 
Secondly, the smallholders of Uganda have been exposed to the workings of 
the market for much longer than their Cambodian colleagues. Back in colonial 
times, they were already cultivating cash crops alongside crops for their own 
consumption. While some Cambodians were working on French rubber and 
rice plantations, most smallholders were growing rice for themselves. In a 
less distant past, the experiments with collective agriculture in the 1970s and 
with socialist planning in the 1980s devastated healthy markets for agricultural 
products. Those markets had to be rebuilt before a substantial improvement in 
former income and a reduction in poverty could become apparent. 
Thirdly, the Cambodian rice monoculture has its drawbacks. The fact that 
farming income is dependent upon a single crop, which is also traded 
internationally, makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in the market price. As a rule, 
Ugandan farmers not only grow several crops, making them less dependent 
upon a single crop, bananas and cassava are also less vulnerable to price shocks. 
Furthermore, this diversification allows them to switch quickly from crops with 
low cash yields to crops with higher ones.
* * *
THAT POLICY MAKES A DIFFERENCE, as emerges from other country 
comparisons, is confirmed by the findings of Leliveld and Ten Brummelhuis in 
Cambodia and Uganda. There is one reservation: the margins for policy effects 
there are smaller than in the countries discussed earlier. Both Cambodia and 
Uganda have, in part as a result of donor pressure, left agricultural development 
to the market. As a result, policy initiatives that achieved such striking results in 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam were not deployed in Cambodia and 
Uganda. 
In Cambodia, there was a successful agricultural education programme for rice 
farmers conducted jointly by government and an NGO. But the agricultural 
policies of both Cambodia and Uganda lack an effective supply of subsidised 
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inputs (fertiliser, seeds, pesticides), subsidised credit and the stabilisation of food 
prices for farmers. The farmers of Cambodia and Uganda are exposed to the 
whims of the markets for inputs and agricultural products, and that makes them 
vulnerable. 
Ten Brummelhuis and Leliveld therefore raise the question of whether 
agricultural policy that focuses exclusively on deregulation, as in Cambodia 
and Uganda, creates adequate conditions for an agricultural economy at a 
higher level of intensive production. The researchers see strong indications 
that the market cannot resolve the coordination problems in poor agricultural 
economies. Policymakers elsewhere in Southeast Asia are thought to have 




ON 12 AND 13 DECEMBER 2011, the organisers of ‘Tracking Development‘ 
arranged a final conference at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The 
Hague. The two coordinators, David Henley and Jan Kees van Donge, both 
addressed the meeting, summarising the main conclusions. It is worth comparing 
their findings with the ‘canon’ of the World Bank, the 1993 report entitled The 
East Asian Miracle. 
The World Bank praised the Asian tigers primarily for their macro-economic 
policy (controlling inflation and the sound adaptation of exchange rates to 
market conditions). Macro-economic policy also played an important role in 
recent decades in development policy in Africa. Henley and Van Donge confirm 
the importance of financial discipline but show that this went hand in hand 
in Southeast Asia with government incentives for smallholders to raise food 
production, higher rural incomes and poverty reduction. In Africa, there was 
a corresponding policy of poverty reduction. ‘The East Asian Miracle’ devotes 
just five pages to ‘Dynamic Agricultural Sectors’. Experience in Southeast Asia, 
according to the Tracking Development researchers, has shown that agriculture 
is much more important than is suggested by this scant coverage. 
At the same time, ‘The Miracle’ spends 88 pages on ‘Markets and Exports’. The 
World Bank suggests that export-driven industrialisation is the key to Southeast 
Asian success. The researchers of Tracking Development demonstrate that 
experience in Southeast Asia actually demonstrates the limitations of a policy of 
forced industrialisation. Industrialisation there, they say, was more the result of 
an appealing investment climate than of industries established and protected by 
the state. Income development in agriculture led to the creation of a domestic 
market, and management of urban food prices kept wages and salaries low, 
making it appealing for industry to move into the area. 
Without trivialising the importance of good governance, the researchers 
conclude from their comparison of sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia that 
policy decisions are more important than good governance as an explanation 
of development. To adopt the jargon – but certainly not the arguments – of the 
World Bank: policies weigh stronger than governance.
Henley and Van Donge drafted their conclusions as a ‘3 x 3’ formula: three 
policy components in combination with three implementation principles. They 
list, as the main elements of successful development policy, in other words of 
policy that results in economic growth and poverty alleviation: (1) adequate 
macro-economic management; (2) pro-poor, pro-rural public spending and 
(3) economic freedom for peasant farmers and small entrepreneurs. The two 
researchers also list three implementation principles underlying both these 
policy decisions and the successful implementation of that policy in Southeast 
Asia: (1) outreach; (2) urgency and (3) expediency. 
The researchers use the term ‘outreach’ to refer to the number of people 
who benefit directly from measures, not to the level of individual benefits and 
certainly not to the theoretical elegance, technical perfection or aesthetic value 
of the intervention. ‘Urgency’ refers to priorities, not plans. At the start of the 
process, at the point of transition from persistent poverty to steady growth, 
successful development strategies do not involve meticulous long-term planning 
based on what is desirable in the future. They involve establishing clear priorities 
based on what is undesirable in the present, and acting quickly on those 
priorities using the resources immediately to hand.
The researchers use the term ‘expediency’ to refer to results, not rules. This 
principle is reminiscent of the expression ‘the end justifies the means’ and it is 
therefore perhaps the most controversial component of the 3 x 3 formula. In 
his paper for the final conference, David Henley put it as follows: ‘In successful 
developmental states, legal principles, administrative procedures, and political 
rights all take second place to the goal of improving the material living 
conditions of as many people as possible, as quickly as possible. Achieving that 
goal may involve tolerating corruption, bending rules, and infringing rights.’ 
For the final conference, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had sent out a lot of 
invitations: diplomats, economists, researchers, people with practical experience 
in the field of economic development and also a few politicians. Over a period 
of three days, they discussed the Tracking Development project and the 
results of the research. There was a lot of praise for the work that had been 
done. Many people were very appreciative of the adopted method – paired 
comparisons of countries in Africa and Asia – and the clarity of the conclusions. 
However, there were some reservations about the three ‘policy preconditions’ 
of successful economic development. 




The least controversial conclusion from Tracking Development was that widely 
supported development is possible only by making investments in small-scale 
farming and rural facilities. Van Donge discussed this with Akinwumi Ayodeji 
Adesina, Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture. The latter was born in Ibadan and his 
doctoral thesis in the USA was in the field of agricultural economics. His past 
employment included the post of director of the Rockefeller Foundation in 
Malawi. 
Why would a young, promising Nigerian opt for a career in agriculture, was Van 
Donge’s question for the Minister. Adesina: ‘Because agricultural development 
is the fastest way of alleviating poverty. Look at China. That country lifted 440 
million people out of poverty by concentrating on agriculture. Africa cannot 
develop without investment in neglected rural areas. About 80 to 90 per cent of 
Africans depend on agriculture. In Nigeria, 70 per cent of the population works 
in that sector. We must invest in peasant farmers to improve production and 
create jobs.’
In answer to the question of what Nigeria’s biggest mistake was from the point 
of view of development, Adesina answered without hesitation: ‘Turning our 
back on agriculture. Nigeria stopped investing in agriculture when we started 
exporting oil. The proportion of the budget spent on agriculture dropped to 1 
per cent, for a sector that accounted for 44 per cent of GDP at the time. And 
by maintaining the naira exchange rate at an artificially high level, we blocked 
our own exports. Instead, the state invested exclusively in the oil industry. 
And we paid a high price. In 1961, Nigeria supplied 41 per cent of the world’s 
groundnuts. At present, we supply 0 per cent. At the time, 80 per cent of 
global cocoa production came from Nigeria; that figure is now 8 per cent. We 
produced large quantities of palm oil, which now generates billions of dollars 
in income for countries in Southeast Asia. We earn nothing at all. Even in the 
1970s, we were self-sufficient in food; now we are a net importer. Nigeria is 
now the world’s second largest importer of rice and its largest wheat importer. 
That cannot continue, because it is fiscally unsustainable and economically 
unacceptable.’
Van Donge asked the Minister who was responsible for neglecting agriculture. 
Adesina: ‘In Nigeria, we have had a long succession of military regimes who 
made one ideological U-turn after another. The policy was completely 
inconsistent. Since 1998, we have had only civil governments. Democracy 
has stabilised. Our citizens now hold the government liable for the results 
of economic development. That is very important, and it was not possible 
when the military was in power. There is a much stronger emphasis now on 
development planning. The current government is targeting economic growth of 
11 per cent in 2020. Our current growth rate is approximately 7.5 per cent. But 
that growth needs to be shared fairly and so we need to get agriculture out of 
the doldrums.’ 
Van Donge also wanted to know whether Adesina had learnt something from 
the experiences of Southeast Asia. The Minister : ‘The most important factors 
I pick up from the experience of Southeast Asia, which has been phenomenal, 
are the importance of political leadership, a determination in the pursuit of 
development goals, and government investment in infrastructure. I am happy 
indeed to adopt general principles like these. But I don’t think we should follow 
Asia’s example slavishly. The public sector played a very large role indeed there 
and I don’t think we should go back to those days.’
Back? ‘Yes. In 1960, the private sector was weak in all developing countries. The 
government did everything: from food production, to transport, storage and 
processing. These days, the private sector is more vigorous and it is the motor 
driving growth. The job of the state is now to create the conditions that allow 
the private sector to perform effectively. By means of research, education and 
investment in infrastructure. For example, the state will have to improve the 
electricity supply because that is still a major problem. At the moment, we 
generate 4500 megawatts annually; by 2015, we want to triple this to 14,000 
megawatts. That involves building gas- and coal-fired power stations, but also 
solar energy and hydro-electric power.’
‘Agriculture’, said Adesina, ‘was often seen as a development project in the 
past. Agriculture has become a business, with the private sector driving growth. 
The farming population is ageing rapidly and so we have to make agriculture 
appealing to younger people. At the moment, that is not the case because they 
have no access to credit or land. So we want to start selling sections of state-
owned land that have fallen into disuse. If we fail to make the sector profitable, 
young people won’t want to work in it. And they often find the work to be too 
demanding physically and so we need modern equipment.’
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Adesina talked about his view of government’s role in agricultural development. 
‘Take farming prices. At the moment, we have food exchanges and a market 
information system that helps to stabilise prices. We don’t always have to use 
public institutions. The government’s role is to introduce quality standards and 
regulate. Take seeds and fertiliser. In Nigeria, fertilisers have always been supplied 
by the state. But that channel always reached only a limited number of farmers. 
As minister, I took the purchasing and distribution of fertilisers out of state 
hands within a month, and entrusted it to the private sector. The same applies to 
seeds. Our current role involves reducing banking risks by providing our banks 
with the financial instruments they need to give loans to seed and fertiliser 
companies. We tell them: if you loan money to those companies, we will cover 
70 per cent of any losses you make. If fertiliser and seed companies are left with 
stocks on their hands at the end of the season, we buy back 30 per cent. And 
if those companies reach 100 per cent of our farmers, we give them a 10 per 
cent bonus. In other words, I am transforming the private sector from a supplier 
for state warehouses into a direct supplier for farmers.’
The minister concluded by saying: ‘My government wants Nigeria to be a 
powerhouse for food production and exports. There is no choice, because 
72 per cent of the population live on just 1 dollar a day. We must create jobs 
quickly, and the fastest way to do that is in agriculture. However, at present, only 
3 per cent of our budget is spent on agricultural policy, even though the sector 
accounts for a quarter of GDP. That is still much too little.’
Macromanagement and financing
The ingredient on which the World Bank and the Tracking Development 
researchers agree is macro-economic stability. None of the participants at 
the conference argued with the importance of controlling inflation, financial 
discipline and a sensible exchange rate policy. Even so, some of them pointed 
out that, in all cases in which macro-economic management in developing 
countries contributed to economic growth, this was associated with 
considerable financial injections from the outside: loans, investment and aid.
Many African countries turned to international financial institutions like the 
IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s, and were then subjected to restrictive 
conditions such as drastic cuts in the public sector and less state intervention. 
These formulae have become infamous as ‘structural transformation’. 
Nigeria under General (President) Babangida also found itself in this situation. 
Akinwumi A. Adesina, Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture, remembered the 1980s: 
‘Of course, a lot of market organisations in Nigeria were much too bureaucratic. 
Of course, public spending got out of hand. But the programme of structural 
transformation was disastrous for our rural economies. Agricultural research? 
There was no more money to fund it. Agricultural education? We had to 
fire advisors throughout the country. Price support for agricultural products? 
We didn’t have the money, while countries in Southeast Asia were receiving 
generous funding from the international community.’
Jan Kees van Donge, who found during the course of the Tracking Development 
project that Malaysia had much more access to international financing than 
Kenya, admitted during the final session: ‘When I hear now that macro-economic 
stabilisation is a prerequisite for growth, I am much more sceptical because 
I now realise the extent to which that growth is dependent on injections of 
capital.’ He reminded the participants that foreign donors had brought together 
large sums of money in 1985 to help Indonesia through an economic crisis. The 
thinking was that the crucial role played by donors at the time had received too 
little attention in discussions about Indonesian development. 
Jan Pronk was the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation in the years 
1973-1977 and 1989-1998. In that capacity, he was also the chairman of the 
Intergovernmental Group for Indonesia (IGGI), the donor organisation. Pronk 
once commented that Indonesia was offered more aid after General Suharto 
came to power than it actually asked for. Why did some countries get so many 
soft loans and others none at all? 
Jan-Paul Dirkse, a historian, diplomat and Indonesia watcher, suggested part of 
the answer. In his contribution, he asked for attention to be paid to factors that 
are not straightforward for economists: culture, contacts, language. In particular, 
he discussed the relationships between the Netherlands and Indonesia in the 
quarter century between 1967 and 1992, the peak years of Suharto’s New 
Order: ‘Suharto was a soldier with a gift for selecting the right advisors. He 
surrounded himself with a group of technocrats who talked the same language 
as just about every significant donor. They were trained in the United States 
and so the Americans had a soft spot for them, as did the World Bank in 
Washington. Others were trained at the Netherlands School of Economics 
(NEH) in Rotterdam and they could still swap ideas in Dutch with Dutch 
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people interested in Indonesia. Turning to development in Indonesia since 
1967, we cannot escape the prominent role played by the donor community. 
This same room in The Hague hosted frequent IGGI meetings in the latter 
half of the 1980s, when donors made increasingly larger sums available to the 
Indonesian government. The process was led by the Netherlands, which in itself 
was remarkable. Other donor consortiums were generally presided over by 
the World Bank. In effect, this was a clever strategic move by Widjojo [Widjojo 
Nitisastro, the leader of the Indonesian technocrats, ed.], who did not like the 
Dutch much, but who was keenly aware of the Dutch tendency to be guided by 
postcolonial reflexes. He knew this would always work in Indonesia’s favour and 
that Pronk would convince major donors such as Japan, the USA and the World 
Bank that the Indonesian proposals were sound and that their approach was 
the right one. Interestingly enough, a large proportion of the policy measures 
proposed by Widjojo and his colleagues had already been developed in 1930s 
by a Dutch economist, Julius Herman Boeke [1884-1956]. He had, in different 
conditions, already placed the emphasis on agriculture and self-sufficiency in 
agricultural products.’ 
The cultural factor, the fact that people talk the same language, is important, said 
Dirkse. For his book about Dutch-Indonesian relations in the years 1962-1992, 
he talked to the American Robert McNamara, who led the World Bank from 
1968 to 1981, a few years before his death in 2009. Dirkse: ‘He was still upbeat 
about the World Bank’s work in Indonesia. He said, in as many words, that the 
fact that “we talked the same language” generated a great deal of development 
funding for Indonesia, even though it was not always spent as wisely as it may 
have been.’ 
Minister Adesina responded enthusiastically: ‘I’m happy somebody has brought 
up McNamara. At the time, he told the Indonesians: “If you don’t produce as 
much rice as you want, I’ll find the funding you need.” The World Bank paid for 
everything, and most of it was free. In the meantime, development aid for Africa 
was cut back for three decades. Including aid for agriculture. You can’t get water 
out of a stone!’
The second day of the final conference was devoted to a debate between the 
researchers of Tracking Development and development economists, chaired 
by the director of the Africa Studies Centre, Ton Dietz. One of those debates 
looked at the thorny issue of the importance of external financing – aid and 
investment. Some participants were convinced that the countries of Southeast 
Asia would never have achieved their economic breakthroughs without 
a massive inflow of foreign funds, either from aid organisations or foreign 
investors. In this area, the differences between Africa and Southeast Asia are 
undeniable. The discussion focused on the ‘crucial moments’, the role of outside 
capital as an acceleration factor, and also on the causal link. Did economic 
growth start after a major wave of investment or did foreign investors arrive 
because they were optimistic about growth? And when do foreign investments 
actually promote growth, and do they subsequently maintain steady growth? 
A lot depends on the relationship between local and foreign capital, and the 
performance of financial systems.
‘Freedom’
The third element of successful development policy identified by the Tracking 
Development researchers was ‘economic freedom for peasant farmers and 
small entrepreneurs’. This has the ring of an article of faith. In the Asian countries 
examined during the project, we see much more state intervention, both in 
agriculture and industry, than would be expected on the basis of the definition 
of this ‘third precondition’. State involvement is not the same a lack of freedom, 
but the term ‘economic freedom’ does not do full justice to the complex 
Southeast Asian reality of state-owned enterprises, market regulation, subsidies 
and price policies. There were lively discussions during the final conference 
about the relative importance of market forces and state intervention. 
Under the heading ‘experience’, Jan Kees van Donge led a debate between 
Akinwumi A. Adesina, Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture, Do Duc Dinh, the 
director of the development studies department at the Institute of World 
Economy in Hanoi, and Arie Kuyvenhoven, emeritus professor of development 
economics at Wageningen University with past experience as a teacher and 
consultant in Nigeria and Indonesia. 
Minister Adesina pointed out that the state had played a very active role in the 
success of Southeast Asia: ‘The institutions that made agriculture work were all 
state-run. They regulated financing, price stability, inputs, education, purchasing 




The same applies to Indonesia, which Tracking Development identified 
as the showpiece of successful poverty reduction. Minister Adesina 
mentioned the controversial Bulog, an Indonesian acronym for Public 
Body for Logistics, which played a major role in Indonesian food policies. 
According to Kuyvenhoven, this was an example of justifiable state 
intervention: ‘In the 1960s, many Asian countries were food importers. 
For Indonesia, turning that situation around was vital. That explains the 
creation of Bulog, a government institution for buying and distributing 
basic food supplies. You can say all you like about Bulog – there were 
quite a lot of irregularities – but it gave Indonesia the opportunity to 
set stable floor prices for rice and ensured that people had enough 
rice. Notwithstanding the problems, Bulog was very important for the 
Indonesian poor.’ 
Van Donge pointed out that the state-owned enterprise Vinafood played – and 
continues to play – the same role in Vietnam as Bulog did in Indonesia. Professor 
Do Duc Dinh agreed but left unresolved the question of how long this would 
continue to be the case: ‘In Vietnam, since the reform era, we have had state-
owned enterprises, collective enterprises, cooperatives and private companies. 
The state sector plays a fundamental role but the private sector is good at 
producing and distributing food, and it will acquire an ever larger role. Vinafood 
will still have a role to play, but it will be less important than in the past.’ 
In 1998, the donors lined up to tell Vietnam that it needed to privatise its 
economy. However, their calls fell on deaf ears. Van Donge asked Do whether 
the secret of Vietnam’s success was perhaps the fact that it did not privatise. Do: 
‘The IMF, the World Bank and other donors did indeed urge us to reduce the 
state-sector burden. But we thought it was useful. The state sector is not very 
efficient by comparison with the private sector but it did lay the foundations 
for the industrialisation of Vietnam. We now have an oil industry, a steel industry 
and a range of construction contractors for infrastructure projects.’ 
When Indonesia started out on the road to industrialisation in the 1980s, there 
was a tendency to support domestic industries through subsidies and to shelter 
them using protectionist tariffs. Kuyvenhoven was appointed as a consultant by 
the Ministry of Industry at the time. ‘Indonesia achieved an enormous boost 
in agricultural productivity – fewer people were producing more – and jobs 
were needed for the people who were turning away from farming. There was 
only one solution: industrialisation. Indonesian policymakers initially adopted the 
classic model of import substitution. Thanks to all sorts of protective measures, 
cement factories, steel plants and textile mills all saw the light of day. But this 
protective approach failed to take comparative benefits and competitive 
strength into account.’
‘We were sent to Indonesia,’ recalled Kuyvenhoven, ‘because the Ministry of 
Industry was not satisfied with the results of the industrialisation policy. It 
was failing to generate enough employment, it was costing too much foreign 
currency, and the emphasis was on capital-intensive industry. An aeroplane 
factory was even built near Bandung, even though Indonesia lacked the required 
know-how. We were asked to advise alternative strategies that would make 
better use of the country’s own natural resources and cheap labour. We thought 
Indonesia would be better off turning to the processing of agricultural products. 
The idea was that this would attract private investors. At the time, there was 
a power struggle at the Ministry of Industry between advocates of protected 
heavy industry and import substitution, and supporters who were more 
concerned about creating employment.’ 
Asia is now advising Africa not to cut back on state intervention too quickly. The 
Vietnamese participant at the conference, Do Duc Dinh, had travelled far and 
wide in Africa in recent years, and his journeys included Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
Van Donge asked him what Africa can learn from Asia. 
Do: ‘Africa now is very much like the Vietnam of the 1980s. Vietnam got moving 
back then, and it’s time for Africa now, too. And it can draw on our experience. 
Africa must start by setting priorities: agricultural development, the production 
of consumer goods and export development. And as for market forces: in 
Vietnam, we have learnt that state-owned enterprises do not generally make 
profits. But you should not hive them off too quickly, because they can help 
to establish an industry. In Tanzania, all industrial state-owned enterprises were 
shut down when the reforms started. For example, the only paper factory in 
the country, the state-owned enterprise, was sold to a South African company 
for one dollar. Even though they could have earned millions from that factory. 





The most surprising conclusion from ‘Tracking Development’ is that the quality 
of public administration, in development jargon governance, is less important 
as an explanation of policy successes and failures. ‘Governance’ covers a whole 
range of factors that combine to form the environment in which development 
policy is created, such as the integrity of the civil service and politicians, formal 
and informal rules, and the performance of financial institutions and public 
services. Development economists, policymakers and international financial 
institutions have started to find these factors increasingly important in recent 
decades. Accordingly, a few participants at the final conference found this 
Tracking Development conclusion difficult to accept. 
Peter Lewis, a lecturer in Africa Studies at the Johns Hopkins University in 
Washington DC, was the first to state his objections. ‘We mustn’t be too 
eager to disregard institutional issues, such as governance, as a factor in 
development. Once we have found that particular policy decisions have been 
effective, we still have to explain why those decisions have been made, why 
they were implemented and why, even if complete consistency was sometimes 
lacking, people have stuck with them for decades. Was that perhaps because 
the institutions were good enough? Because teachers were paid on time, 
agricultural advisers did their work, and because the banking sector operated 
efficiently enough? These are all features of both public services and the overall 
institutional environment in large parts of Africa. We must ask ourselves what 
improvements are needed in the quality of governance to achieve results in 
terms of shared economic growth.’ 
Seth D. Kaplan, an American consultant in the field of development issues 
and the author of Fixing Fragile States (2008), looked in greater depth at 
a widely-discussed governance problem: corruption. ‘We assume that the 
numbers supplied by some international think-tanks about phenomena such 
as “corruption” and “governance” provide an adequate picture of corruption 
in a particular country. But I believe they misleading and even deceptive. 
Everybody who does business in Asia and Africa will agree: corruption is not a 
simple phenomenon. Corruption is several things at the same time. Corruption 
in China costs money but it doesn’t affect results. Corruption in Africa costs 
money and it has a dramatic impact on results. Bad governance in China is not 
as bad as in any given African country, even though the international scores may 
be the same. So the numbers are virtually meaningless.’ 
Both coordinators responded. Jan Kees van Donge had the following to say: ‘As 
an Africanist looking at the reality of Asia, you see enormous waste. For example 
in steel plants, which are extremely inefficient. Malaysia has its own car industry, 
which produces a car called the Proton, and this is not exactly an industry which 
performs optimally. The prevailing idea is that Southeast Asia is a smoothly 
operating development machine, but that is not the case. That is the reality I 
am trying to capture when I talk about the quality of governance. The Malaysian 
government lost an estimated $350 million speculating in tin in the 1980s. But 
Malaysia also has the national oil company Petronas, which is exemplary in 
terms of efficiency. In Indonesia, the national oil company Pertamina fell into the 
hands of the Suharto clan in the 1980s and flirted with catastrophe as a result. 
In Africa, it is not difficult to find examples of wasteful plans and projects. And a 
lot of personal enrichment is involved. The question now is why Southeast Asia 
survived these squanderous practices, while Africa did not. Yes, institutions are 
important but they are not as decisive as many people think.’ 
David Henley agreed with Seth Kaplan: not all corruption is the same. ‘The 
difference,’ he said, ‘is a question of predictability. Many people feel that this is the 
most important difference between corruption in Africa and corruption in Asia. 
When corruption is completely predictable, it turns into taxation, and investors 
can take taxation into account. When we turn to development policy, we can 
see corruption as a given to be included in investment decisions. We can also 
see corruption as a factor that affects the implementation of policy. Africanists 
are obsessed by this latter area: the degree to which the hands of government 
are tied during the determination of policy or to which they are simply 
ineffective because the policies they draw up are simply not implemented. I 
would be more impressed by that argument if African leaders had seriously 
tried, with the same urgency we have seen in Asia, to implement the right 
policies. As far as I know, that has been the case so infrequently that there is 
little reason to see corruption as a serious obstacle to implementation.’ 
In the economists’ debate on the second day of the final conference, putting 
‘governance’ into perspective was a widely supported approach. One question 
that emerged was the degree to which ‘bad governance’ can go hand-in-hand 
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with economic breakthroughs and whether it may not even be a precondition. 
Stability and confidence in the continuity of leadership were seen as more 
important for steady growth than compliance with all the criteria of good 
governance. Some forms of authoritarian, even corrupt, governance that 
benefit the poor and provide for stability can be the backdrop to long-term 
growth. This is a familiar controversy in political economics: does economic 
growth create a middle class that then demands transparent government and 
more liberal conditions for its urban lifestyle and economic behaviour? Or is 
‘good governance’ required first, together with freedom for business and the 
middle class in general before steady growth can be achieved? The Tracking 
Development findings tend towards the first position, although the question 
that then inevitably emerges is which forms of corruption and lack of freedom 
further growth, and which get in its way. 
Policy and interests
It is all about making the right policy decisions, conclude the Tracking 
Development researchers. But then the inevitable question is: why was it 
precisely the leaders of Southeast Asia who made the right decisions over 
the past half-century? That question, which addresses the motives underlying 
policy decisions, was stated most powerfully by Seth Kaplan. He had been 
somewhat irritated by the paper in which David Henley set out the three 
policy preconditions for successful development policy: outreach, urgency and 
efficiency. Kaplan: ‘The final paragraph, in the last sentence but one, of the paper 
says: “It [the paper] has not yet attempted to specify the political conditions 
under which regimes emerge that are likely to commit themselves to these 
goals.” That one sentence sums up my frustration immediately. The question is 
left open of why government A does do something and why government B 
doesn’t.’ 
‘I always wonder: what role does the socio-political dynamic play? What is the 
role of the regime’s ideology? Has it worked as a bonding factor, as an engine? 
What role does national cohesion play? In Southeast Asia, Myanmar is the only 
country with major ethnic tensions. It may be a coincidence, but that is precisely 
the country where development has almost completely failed to take off. In 
Africa, Botswana has been the most successful country economically and it is 
also the country where internal cohesion is highest. 
‘And what is the effect of the environment? Are there successful countries in 
the vicinity from which these countries in Southeast Asia have learnt? Was there 
aid or investment from those countries? I do not believe that China would be 
in its current position without that “neighbour effect”. Looking at Africa, I see 
major similarities between the development ideology there and the Europe 
of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Those ideas are still leading. Is that why the Africans 
have learnt the wrong lessons? And is that the mistake of the donors? In short, 
was there an element in Southeast Asia in the ideology of the elite or the 
government, something in national cohesion, that propelled the process and that 
is difficult to reproduce in Africa? You need pulling power to get the bandwagon 
rolling.’
Henley took up the gauntlet: ‘Of course we’ve thought about this and we have 
had long and lively debates. And in future publications we do indeed discuss 
the political background to decision-making in Southeast Asia. In somewhat 
simplified terms: there are two types of state in the area that have been 
successful in economic development. On the one hand, there are the counter-
revolutionary states – Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand – and, on the other, there 
are the post-revolutionary states that have implemented market-driven reforms 
– Vietnam and its neighbours. Nevertheless, in both cases, the legacy of socialism 
and of the armed struggle was crucial. And that does not bode well for Africa 
because socialism as an ideology has not played any significant role in most 
African countries and where it did, as in Kenya, it was no more than nationalist 
rhetoric.
‘Other factors are slightly more complex. They are, I believe, linked to the way in 
which the world view of African policymakers has been formed in the past by 
idealistic notions. The cultural gap between African policymakers and rural areas, 
as well as experience with rapid changes in the colonial period, have imbued 
African politicians with a sense of development as a radical metamorphosis, by 
contrast with the gradual model of economic development adopted by Asians. 
‘So a range of factors are involved and we are certainly not ignoring them. Even 
so, the issue remains of how relevant all this is. If we want to draw conclusions 
that are significant in terms of future policy, conclusions about what has to 
be done, then the question of why Asians and Africans have taken particular 
decisions in the past is less relevant. What matters is whether people can be 
prompted to take the right decisions in the future. Nobody believes this will 
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be easy. The best avenue open to us is to show policymakers in Africa that 
pro-poor policy is not just good for the poor. That it is development policy, 
and that it will in time benefit both the urban elites and the rural masses. The 
least we can say is that it has worked in Southeast Asia. And that must surely 
influence policymakers in Africa and the members of the donor community 
who influence them.’
David Booth made the concluding remarks to this theme. He works as a 
researcher for the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London, where 
he manages the ‘Africa Power and Politics Programme’. His contribution was 
therefore about politics and power:
‘We started this meeting this morning with a crystal-clear message. Of course, 
we can all make that message better, even more robust, but it can also become 
less clear. Tracking Development must stick with the message we were given this 
morning: that the right policy decisions do indeed make a difference.
‘That raises the question – and that is what the discussion increasingly centred 
on – of how rulers arrive at these decisions. Well, some opt for sensible policies, 
and others don’t. It’s about priorities. If I may sum up the thinking, not just with 
respect to Southeast Asia, but more or less for all fast growers in Eastern Asia, 
it is ultimately about a fundamental challenge to national security in a critical 
period. In many, but not all, cases, this was the dynamic of the Cold War. That 
dictated the overriding priority for economic development: to face up to a 
major challenge to national security. And such a powerful political motive means 
that a particular policy will be adopted and institutionalised over the course of 
time. So you cannot just import packages of policies. But nor can you throw 
up your hands and say that every situation is unique and that no lessons can 
be learnt. Of course lessons can be learnt. But when it comes to the crunch, a 
particular policy will generate support and priority only if it furthers the political 
survival of the most important decision-makers, the top leaders. Leaders will try 




CHINA IS INVESTING IN African roads, mines and agricultural land, and India 
is following that example. Africa, which started out on the road of independence 
of a century ago in the same circumstances as Asia, has lost the initiative. Its 
failure to keep up is particularly painful when we compare sub-Saharan Africa 
with the countries of tropical Southeast Asia, which acquired the honorary title 
of ‘tiger economies’ in the 1980s. Africa still has no economic tigers.
In 1960, Africans were richer on average than Southeast Asians. In about 1980, 
Southeast Asia overtook Africa in terms of growth, and per capita income 
there is now twice what it is in Africa. In the 1990s, there was some growth 
in Africa thanks to improved macro-economic policies and rising demand for 
mineral resources. But that growth has not helped to cut poverty levels. In 
Southeast Asia, economic growth was associated with a spectacular reduction 
of poverty. In Indonesia, the percentage of people living below the poverty line 
fell from 60 in 1970 to 22 in 1984. Other countries in the region booked similar 
achievements, albeit at different times. The latest winner is Vietnam.
Many Africanists attribute Africa’s failure to corruption and ‘weak institutions’. 
David Henley, the Tracking Development researcher, is sceptical about this 
explanation: ‘Indonesia, during the period of its greatest development success 
in the 1970s, ran neck-on-neck with Nigeria for the title of most corrupt 
country, with Thailand as a close runner-up. The reason for Africa’s failure, 
we would argue, is not corruption and is not the failing implementation of 
potentially successful development policies. Rather it lies in the fact that Africa’s 
governments have actually never tried to implement the kinds of policies which 
proved successful in Asia.’
In Indonesia, incomes started to rise, after a long period of stagnation, in 1967 
when General Suharto took over the presidency. In Nigeria, which the project 
compared with Indonesia, among other reasons because both countries are 
major oil producers, the economy also continued to grow for some time 
because of its oil revenues. But that growth was not maintained. In Southeast 
Asia, the economy continued to grow due to a development strategy that 
favoured rural areas and the poor. 
Indonesia initially financed investment with foreign aid, and later from its oil 
revenues. A third of the development budget went to agriculture. The irrigation 
system was improved and new rice varieties with high yields were introduced. 
Fertilisers and credit were subsidised. The state guaranteed farmers a minimum 
price for their rice. Between 1968 and 1985, yields per hectare rose by 80 per 
cent. In the 1960s, Indonesia was still the world’s largest importer of rice; by 
1984, the country was self-sufficient.
The new agricultural technology was labour-intensive. Tens of millions of farmers 
and land workers benefited. The government also invested in rural roads, 
electricity, schools and health care in rural areas, which are home to 70 per cent 
of the population. This was mostly financed from aid. The economy as a whole 
started to grow, and private parties began to have confidence in the country 
in the 1980s. They started to invest in labour-intensive industries for export: 
clothing, shoes and electronics. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, something similar 
happened.
In Malaysia, steady growth began in 1958, when the government of the newly-
independent Federation of Malaya announced that it would ‘give top priority to 
the task of improving the lot of the rural inhabitants.’ Within fifteen years, high-
yielding rubber trees had been planted in two thirds of small rubber plantations 
using government subsidies. At the same time, rice production doubled, again 
within fifteen years, thanks to new irrigation projects which made it possible to 
grow two rice crops in the same paddy each year instead of just one. 
In Vietnam, rice production doubled between 1975 and 1990. This is the same 
development, but later. By contrast with the usual thinking, that increase in 
production was not so much a result of deregulation. Production rose during 
that period mainly as a result of the extension of the irrigated area under 
cultivation, making double cropping possible, as in Malaysia. 
In Cambodia, everything happened later because of the disruption caused by 
the Pol Pot regime. But in Cambodia too, particularly since 2005, we have seen 
steady growth and poverty alleviation, as well as an increasing government 
emphasis on agriculture and rural development. 
Everywhere in Southeast Asia, steady growth and poverty reduction started 
with an agricultural revolution supported by peasant farmers but made possible 
by high levels of government investment. The exact causal link between this 
agricultural revolution and later industrial development is unclear but we do 
know that the transformation of farming was the first step on each occasion. 
7.  Conclusion – Development starts with agriculture
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The policy measures unleashing this revolution were based on the 
understanding among Southeast-Asian policymakers of the two principles of 
successful development planning. The first principle is that development is, in the 
first place, a question of numbers and that the most effective policy measures 
are those that benefit the largest number of people. The second principle 
amounts to a sense of urgency: the awareness that what matters in the early 
stages of development is not meticulous long-term planning, but priorities. 
Why was this? The political realities of the 1960s forced Asian elites to take the 
interests of peasant farmers seriously. Malaysia (and Thailand) faced Communist 
uprisings after the war. The Communist party of Indonesia depended on 
the support of the Javanese rural poor and seriously threatened to achieve 
dominance until it was crushed by the military in 1965. The development 
plans for rural areas served to neutralise the appeal of political radicalism and 
therefore to safeguard the power of the elites.
African governments saw ‘development’ primarily as rapid industrialisation to 
get ahead of backward agriculture. While Indonesia was spending its oil dollars 
in the 1970s on labour-intensive agriculture, Nigeria was using its oil revenue 
for capital-intensive industrial projects, including an enormous steel factory that 
has never produced any steel. Even when they produced something, these new 
industries employed very few people. They were like cathedrals in the desert. 
Nigerian planners saw the growing gap between rich and poor as ‘the price of 
rapid development’.
A few African countries such as Kenya, another country that Tracking 
Development has scrutinised, did focus on agriculture. The agricultural sector 
was not neglected to the same extent as in Nigeria. But even in Kenya, 
economic growth was hampered by an elitist view of the development process. 
The Kenyan government did not back the masses of rural farmers, who 
demanded most attention. The government thought they were ‘conservative’ 
and not sufficiently innovation-minded. The authorities actually put their money 
on a small group of ‘progressive’ farming entrepreneurs. In the 1960s, agricultural 
subsidies went to 3 per cent of farmers, an elite. 
The African pattern of state spending on different economic sectors has not 
changed in recent years from the situation in 1980. It closely resembles the 
expenditure pattern in the present, industrialising, Southeast Asia. But it is very 
different from the Asian pattern in 1980, when there was massive investment 
there in the two sectors that Asian policymakers considered crucial to launch 
economic development: agriculture and the transport infrastructure. In Asia 
as a whole – including India – 15 per cent of public spending in 1980 was on 
agriculture. In 2005, the same figure for Africa was 5 per cent. The other sector, 
transport and communications (mainly road construction), accounted for a 
much higher proportion of Asian spending in the 1980s than we are currently 
seeing in Africa. These patterns have therefore hardly changed at all. 
Even so, many observers think that recent developments in African agriculture 
are promising. They think that the policy mistakes of the past can finally be 
corrected. In 2003, the member states of the recently established African Union 
(the successor to the Organisation of African Unity) resolved to devote at least 
10 per cent of government spending to agriculture. So far, only eight countries 
have actually done so. And the target of 10 per cent falls a long way short. 
Indonesia, where the conditions for agriculture are much more favourable, 
earmarked 22 per cent of public spending for that sector in 1979.
* * *
What can Africans and donors learn from Tracking Development? 
Mercy Karanja, a Kenyan who worked for the Ministry of Agriculture for 
many years, leaving her post with considerable reluctance to start a second 
career with the Kenyan National Farmers Union, had the following to say at a 
conference at Wageningen University in October 2007: ‘It is not just the donor 
community, that keeps harping on about pulling down tariff walls, but also our 
own political leaders who need a wake-up call. And that is only possible if 
farmers have more power. Since the arrival of multi-party elections in 2002 in 
Kenya, our voice is being heard. Really, without strong farmers unions, there will 
be no change of course in Africa.’ 
Jan Kees van Donge had the following to say after the project finished: ‘Without 
the threat of communism and of a potentially powerful, rebellious farming 
community, you cannot understand Southeast Asia. That does not, incidentally, 
mean that African leaders are unable to understand that it is also in their 
interests to give priority to raising farmers’ incomes.’
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According to David Henley, electoral democracy does not put the same 
pressure on African governments as the Asian uprisings did in the past. ‘But 
donors can prioritise the right activities. They can call the attention of African 
elites to the fact that successes elsewhere have been achieved by pro-poor, pro-
rural strategies. Those strategies not only alleviated poverty but also initiated 
processes that brought prosperity to entire countries.’ 
The message would appear to be getting across. Ruud Treffers, the Dutch 
ambassador to the World Bank, had the following to say at the Tracking 
Development final conference: ‘It is of course very logical to prioritise 
agricultural development when most people live in rural areas and depend on 
agriculture for their livelihoods. It is strange that we have forgotten about this 
over the course of the years.’
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